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This essay is about ultimate standards of law in the United States. 
Not surprisingly, our federal Constitution figures prominently in any 
account of our ultimate standards of law, and a discussion of its place 
is an apt jurisprudential endeavor for the bicentennial of the constitu-
tional convention. Although in passing I offer some comments on con-
stitutional principles, this essay is not about how the Constitution, or 
indeed other legal materials, should be understood and interpreted. 
Rather, it attempts to discern the jurisprudential implications of wide-
spread practices involving the Constitution and other standards of 
law. 
The ambitions of the essay are most easily explained in terms of its 
origins. For many years, I have taught students in jurisprudence 
courses the central themes of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law. 1 
Among the most important themes is the idea of a rule of recognition, 
which expresses a society's ultimate criteria for what counts as law. 
Rejecting John Austin's claim that commands of a sovereign are the 
ultimate standard of legality, Hart writes of a rule of recognition, a 
test accepted by officials for determining what normative standards are 
part of the legal corpus.2 Each time I have asked students what the 
rule ofrecognition is in the United States, the answer has seemed more 
difficult and complex. 
My attempt to deal with this intellectual puzzle in a systematic 
way is the root of this essay; I offer here a fairly comprehensive ac-
count of how one might try to state a rule of recognition for someplace 
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University. A.B. 1958, Swarthmore Col-
lege; B. Phil. 1960, Oxford University; LL.B. 1963, Columbia University. - Ed. 
I am enormously grateful to H.L.A. Hart, whose careful critical comments on two previous 
drafts helped prevent confusion and imprecision and opened up avenues for examination. I want 
also to thank Bruce Ackerman, Meir Dan-Cohen, Stephen Massey, Henry Monaghan, David 
Morris, and Stephen Munzer who gave me helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Daniel Alter 
and Brad Theis, who provided research assistance. I also profited from discussion of the paper 
by the New York University Law and Philosophy Colloquium. 
1. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) [hereinafter THE CONCEPT OF LAW]. 
2. See id., especially at 97-120. 
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in this country.3 My aims in this respect are primarily analytical and 
pedagogical, to demonstrate what critical issues are and what ap-
proaches are needed to resolve them. My method is also pedagogical 
in a special way. I sometimes offer a first approximation for resolution 
of a particular problem, leaving aside complexities. Once those com-
plexities are explored in a related context, I return to the original 
problem for a more complete resolution. This strategy has drawbacks 
for the resolution of any particular issue, but it permits a more logical 
unfolding of stages of analysis. 
The analysis, which illuminates intriguing and rarely discussed fea-
tures of the American legal order, certainly dispels any illusion that 
the rule of recognition for the United States can be reduced to any 
simple statement, such as "The federal Constitution is our rule of rec-
ognition." I demonstrate that the rule of recognition will have a 
number of standards and be quite complex, omitting some of the fed-
eral Constitution while including aspects of state law and interpretive 
standards used by judges. Although I make tentative choices among 
alternative hypotheses about a rule of recognition, I do not undertake 
the extensive historical or legal research that would be needed to make 
fully considered judgments about every troublesome question. 
In applying what Hart says to our complicated legal order, I have 
progressively grasped some of the effort's broader implications for 
Hart's own theory and for divergencies between that theory and its 
main competitor. It was not until I had struggled with these matters 
for some time that I realized more was involved than applying Hart's 
basic theory to an extremely complicated legal reality. Aspects of that 
reality proved recalcitrant in the face of Ha~'s categories; the concep-
tual possibilities and relationships among standards proved richer than 
one would gather from The Concept of Law. At this point, the second 
ambition of the essay emerged: to amplify Hart's basic idea of a rule 
of recognition so that it could apply without distortion to the United 
States. In the course of trying to discern the rule of recognition for the 
United States, I show, among other things, how uncertain the ultimate 
standards of law may be in a stable legal system; how the ultimate 
standards may shift unnoticed over time; how the precise relationship 
between the "ultimate rule" and "supreme criterion" may vary from 
the one Hart supposes; and how the interaction between acceptance 
and higher norms may have a level of complexity greater than he 
imagines. 
3. I use the word "someplace" because, as will subsequently be made clear, the ultimate rule 
of recognition is different in each state. 
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For some time I supposed that I could rest with developing and 
applying to the United States a somewhat enriched account of Hart's 
approach, leaving for others the overall adequacy of such an account 
in light of challenges made to it, most notably by Ronald Dworkin.4 
But I came to understand both that some of the problems with discov-
ering the rule of recognition for the United States could not be re-
solved without reference to those challenges and that the concrete 
effort at application provided a valuable window for assessing impor-
tant disagreements between Hart and Dworkin. Much of the best 
writing about Dworkin's disagreements with Hart over ultimate stan-
dards of law has been general and at a high level of abstraction. 5 
Though something may be lost by concentrating on the details of a 
particular legal system, as this essay does, attention to such details 
clarifies much of what is at stake by illustrating competing possibilities 
in a familiar context. The exercise of applying Hart's approach to the 
United States shows why one needs to draw from basic insights of 
both Hart and Dworkin to reach a satisfactory theoretical understand-
ing about American law. 
The essay thus proceeds at three levels: (1) application to the 
United States of Hart's concepts regarding the rule of recognition; 
(2) enrichment of those concepts in light of this country's law and 
legal institutions; (3) evaluation of some strengths and weaknesses of 
this general approach to how ultimate legal standards are discerned, 
and a sketch of a fuller and more adequate account. The main body of 
the essay is primarily addressed to the first level, though it involves 
comments of obvious relevance for the second level and lays the 
groundwork for discussion at the third. Only near the end of the pa-
per do I draw together my conclusions about how Hart's theory re-
quires amplification and treat the relevant disagreements between him 
and Dworkin in a systematic way. In order to help the reader see how 
the details of application to the United States of the idea of a rule of 
recognition relate to the more abstract jurisprudential issues, I begin 
by briefly summarizing Hart's theory and the core of the challenge to 
it and by circumscribing the plausible range of disagreement. 
Before embarking on that endeavor, I want to offer the reader, es-
4. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-130, 338-53 (1978 ed.) [hereinaf-
ter TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter LAW'S EM-
PIRE]; Dworkin, A Reply, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 247 
(M. Cohen ed. 1984) [hereinafter A Reply]. 
5. See, e.g., J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979); Coleman, Negative and Positive Posi-
tivism. 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982); Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations 
of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982); Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The 
Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 15 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977). 
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pecially one not closely familiar with the relevant literature, two cau-
tions. The first is that I employ terms like "rule of recognition" and 
"supreme criterion" in a technical way, following Hart's understand-
ing since I am exploring the implications of his theory. I am not try-
ing to defend the meanings he assigns as the only or best possible 
meanings of those terms. The reader who entertains different mean-
ings will have to remember that my claims about application are only 
about the concepts Hart uses, not about every meaning that could be 
assigned to the key terms. 
The second caution is that my effort here involves conceptual clari-
fication. Insofar as theoretical clarifications dispel confusion they may 
have some indirect practical influence, but I have no practical point to 
make here about how actors in the legal system should interpret the 
Constitution or other legal materials. Of course, it is possible that at 
some subconscious level practical aims are driving my attempt at theo-
retical understanding, and it is almost certainly true that no attempt at 
understanding the nature of social institutions is wholly compartmen-
talized from the social world one would like to see. But the reader 
who is looking for theory that has some meaty and straightfonvard 
practical significance, who is ill-disposed to conceptual elaboration for 
its own sake, is bound to be extremely disappointed by what follows 
and would be well advised to stop here. 
II. HART'S CONVENTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW AND THE 
NORMATIVE CHALLENGE TO IT 
According to Hart, societies with advanced legal systems have cri-
teria for distinguishing authoritative legal norms from norms that do 
not have legal status. These tests or criteria need not be understood by 
the general populace; they are employed by officials. To state for a 
particular society what the criteria of law are, and the hierarchy in 
which these criteria stand to each other, is to describe the standards 
that recognized officials now accept. 6 The reconstruction of the prac-
tices of officials tells us what the standards are for law in a society. 
When societies experience revolution, sharp conflict may exist over 
who exercises official authority; and in some societies officials may be 
guided in their actual decisions by "authorities" (such as party offi-
6. At first glance, this account may seem to involve a troubling circularity, since officials 
determine what are the standards of law and they derive their official status from the law. The 
break in the circle is that one looks to the population at large to see who are recognized as 
officials. Ordinarily, people's judgments about who are officials may rely on certain assumptions 
about conformance with legal standards, such as election laws, but people need not understand 
the complex criteria judges and other officials use to determine what counts as law. 
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cials) that they do not publicly acknowledge as having the power to 
determine what is valid law. As Hart does for the most part, 7 I shall 
disregard these possibilities and concentrate on a stable legal order in 
which the criteria that officials purport to follow are those they gener-
ally do regard as authoritative. 
In explaining the ultimate rule of recognition, Hart supposes that a 
question is raised about the validity of a local ordinance. 8 American-
izing the illustration, we might ask if what is claimed to be a housing 
regulation was adopted by the city council; if so, whether the city 
charter gave such power to the council; if so, whether the state legisla-
ture gave such power to the city government; if so, whether the state 
constitution gave such power to the state legislature; if so, whether the 
federal Constitution authorizes, or allows, the exercise of such power 
by the states. At each early stage in the process, we can refer to a 
higher standard that validates the lower standard for determining 
whether the rule counts as law. Finally, however, we reach a point at 
which the effect of a standard does not depend on a higher standard 
that we can refer to; all we can say is that this standard for determin-
ing law is accepted in the society. When we arrive at such a standard, 
we have reached the ultimate rule of recognition. That rule does not 
derive validity from a superior legal rule, it owes its status as law to its 
acceptance by officials. 
Hart's discussion of the ultimate rule of recognition includes an 
account of a "supreme criterion" which is all or part of the ultimate 
rule: 
[A] criterion of legal validity or source of law is supreme if rules identi-
fied by reference to it are still recognized as rules of the system, even if 
they conflict with rules identified by reference to the other criteria, 
whereas rules identified by reference to the latter are not so recognized if 
they conflict with the rules identified by reference to the supreme 
criterion. 9 
Since Hart's phrase, "the rule of recognition," can be the source of 
confusion, we need to be clear about how he is using the term. First, 
"rules" are often thought of as imposing duties. The rule of recogni-
tion, which sets out criteria for identifying law, does not tell people in 
any simple way how to act, though it may be "duty-imposing" in the 
7. Hart discusses revolution in THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 114-15. He suggests, 
id. at 68, that if an official habitually obeys someone else, that does not mean the person he obeys 
has legal authority; but Hart does not address a society in which the authority of those outside 
the legal hierarchy is generally acknowledged and has some legal support, as the authority of 
Communist Party members may be recognized in Communist countries. 
8. Id. at 103-04. 
9. Id. at 103. 
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more complex sense of setting standards for how officials perform their 
functions. 10 
Second, nothing in the basic term "rule of recognition" necessarily 
suggests ultimacy; one could comfortably speak of the conferral of 
legal authority upon cities by a state legislature as a "rule of recogni-
tion," though the state legislature's power is itself derived from the 
state constitution. As a criterion courts would use to identify valid 
city law, the conferral of authority by the state legislature might be 
called a derivative rule of recognition. Hart, however, reserves the 
words "rule of recognition" to refer to ultimate standards for identify-
ing law; in his terminology, a standard that can be derived from an-
other legal standard is not part of the rule of recognition. To minimize 
possible confusion I follow him here, using other terms when I refer to 
derivative criteria. 
Third, Hart is clear that the ultimate standards for identifying law 
may include quite separate strands. One might wish to speak of each 
of these as an independent rule, together comprising the ultimate rules 
of recognition. 11 Though Hart occasionally falls into using the plural 
"rules of recognition" in this way, 12 for the most part he intends the 
singular "rule of recognition" to include every ultimate standard for 
determining law in a particular political society. Again, for simplic-
ity's sake, I adhere to his terminology. 
Hart's account is conventionalist. What counts as law depends ul-
timately upon prevailing social practices, that is, what officials take as 
counting as law. If a judge or other official were to try to determine 
the law, he would implicitly employ the rule of recognition and what 
can be derived from it. If a sociologist were trying to describe the legal 
system, he would use the rule of recognition both to identify the 
corpus of law and to conceptualize how officials determine what is 
law. In calling the rule of recognition a social rule, Hart means more 
than that the rule expresses a convergence of perspectives officials hap-
pen to take about what is law. The rule must be "effectively accepted 
as common public standards of official behaviour by [a system's] offi-
cials."13 Part of the reason why officials use the rule is because they 
conceive it as representing a shared social practice upon which expec-
tations are built. 
10. See N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 113-15 (1981); J, RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL 
SYSTEM 198-99 (2d ed. 1980). 
11. See J. RAZ, supra note 10, at 200. 
12. See, e.g., THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 92. 
13. Id. at 113. This aspect of the rule of recognition is explored in depth by Gerald Postema, 
supra note 5. On the notion of social rules, see N. MACCORMICK, supra note 10, at 29-44. 
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Hart usually speaks as if the main features of the rule of recogni-
tion and most of its applications will be reasonably straightforward. 
He clearly does not think the rule of recognition must include stan-
dards of morality, and it is probably fair to say that among the ad-
vanced legal systems in which he is primarily interested, Hart does not 
believe standards of morality will be among the rule's most important 
features. 14 For issues raised about the law that are not settled by refer-
ence to the rule of recognition or derivations from it, Hart talks as if a 
judge or other official has discre~ion, that is, a kind oflegislative choice 
how to apply a vague standard to concrete facts or how to fill in an 
open gap in the rule of recognition itself or in one of the standards that 
derives from it. 
Mainly addressing the role of judges in common-law systems, Ron-
ald Dworkin has challenged the sharp distinction Hart draws between 
validity based on derivation from higher standards and the acceptance 
on which ultimate standards rest. Dworkin points out that even in 
Hart's theory the legal force of a particular claimed custom will de-
pend partly on its acceptance;15 more important, the vast number of 
principles, such as "no one should profit from his wrongdoing," that 
figure in adjudication depend not on prescription by a single authorita-
tive act but on vague facts of institutional acceptance.16 Since many of 
these "legal" principles will replicate or closely resemble moral princi-
ples, Dworkin's account draws a much less sharp distinction than 
Hart's between standards of law and moral standards. Further, 
Dworkin claims that the reach of legal duty extends to cases that are 
not resolved by any socially accepted rule of recognition; the judge 
deciding difficult cases must as a matter of law undertake (explicitly or 
implicitly) a complex exercise in interpretation, seeking to develop and 
apply the soundest theory of law.17 Dworkin's more recent writings 
make plain that though soundness is partly a matter of fit with legal 
materials, the judge ~nterpreting the law will make important in-
14. Moral standards, however, might figure into a full account of the authority of precedent 
or custom. That would be so if a precedent judged to have morally unacceptable applications 
had less force in some sense than other precedents or if a custom could have legal authority only 
if morally acceptable. Hart says that "reasonableness" is one test of whether a custom has legal 
status in England. THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 46. Presumably one way in which a 
custom could be unreasonable would be by being morally reprehensible. 
Hart also says that in countries like the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity 
"explicitly incorporate principles of justice or substantive moral values." Id. at 199. Whether 
this observation is actually faithful to Hart's own account depends on how the relation between 
the federal Constitution and the rule of recognition is conceptualized, a subject treated in section 
IV infra. 
15. See TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 41-43. 
16. Id. at 39-44. 
17. See, e.g., id. at 46-130; LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4. 
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dependent judgments of political and moral philosophy - independ-
ent in the sense of not being determined by the legal materials 
themselves. 18 The reason a judge employs a particular interpretive 
theory is because it seems soundest, not because it is socially accepted. 
In contrast to a conventionalist account, Dworkin offers a normative 
or interpretive account. The judge's final standards of what consti-
tutes law are the best normative interpretive judgments he or she can 
make. 
Subsequently, as I try to evaluate how well conventionalist and 
normative accounts apply to particular standards for determining law, 
I undertake a deeper analysis of distinguishing features of the two 
sorts of accounts. Here it is useful to make two preliminary points. 
First, many of the specific questions that Hart's theory raises about 
the United States also arise if one tries to construct the most convinc-
ing normative account of what law is in this country. In a reconstruc-
tion of the basic structure of American law, the problems I raise 
largely transcend the debate over the nature of law's foundations, 
though how one tries to resolve the problems will depend partly on 
one's perspective about those foundations. 
The second, more complicated point, is that a good many of Hart's 
crucial premises are left intact even if the normative challenge is fun-
damentally accurate. No one denies that certain kinds of legal norms 
require creation by nonjudicial bodies whose competence to legislate 
depends on conferral by authoritative legal norms. In most of the 
United States, for example, judges have no common-law power to cre-
ate new crimes. 19 Though they may rely on principles to interpret 
legislative mandates, judges cannot declare behavior to be criminal 
just because it offends principles that the legal system embraces in 
some general way. Nor can courts create new taxes or authorize mili-
tary conscription. These matters are left to legislatures, whose author-
ity is conferred by federal and state constitutions. The validity of a 
great many legal norms can undoubtedly be traced in much the man-
ner Hart envisions. Also, the legal order undeniably contains impor-
tant principles of hierarchy: that federal law is superior to state law; 
that statutory law is superior to judicially created common law; and 
that constitutional law is superior to both statutory and common law. 
One aspect of this hierarchy is that rules of common law or interpreta-
tions of statutes that are based on principles can be overridden by sub-
sequent legislative choice. In Riggs v. Palmer, 20 discussed by 
18. See especially LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 248, 255·63. 
19. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE§ 1.5 comment (1985). 
20. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). 
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Dworkin,21 the court held that a murderer cannot recover under the 
will of the person he murdered; but if the state legislature explicitly 
chose to allow such recovery, it could do so. 
Even if it is true that in deciding what the law is judges look for the 
best interpretive theory rather than a socially accepted rule, it is also 
true that in any stable legal order there is bound to be a very great 
overlap in the content of what judges see as the best interpretive theo-
ries. 22 A convergence on many points will amount to a rule, or rules, 
for determining law that a sociologist could describe. Such is the situ-
ation in the United States, for example, in regard to the authority of 
the Constitution and the supremacy of legislation over the common 
law. Important theoretical questions about a legal order concern the 
nature and extent of these basic and agreed-upon standards. 
At a deeper level, a normative account of how law is determined 
does not entirely escape dependence on convention. After all, every 
judge within a system takes as given certain basic materials that count 
as law; the judge who refers directly to the Articles of Confederation 
rather than the Constitution as a source of modem law is crazy. And 
Dworkin himself has argued that institutional support is critical to the 
status of principles. A plausible rendering of this understanding 
would be to say that even a normative account builds on many con-
ventionally accepted sources oflaw,23 that the critical respect in which 
it differs from the conventionalist approach is in claiming that the 
binding standards for what counts as law extend well beyond what is 
conventionally accepted. 
A normative theorist might resist this ingestion of conventionalism 
by asserting that nothing is law simply because it is conventionally 
accepted, that any accepted practice regarding the identification of law 
is in theory open to rejection or revision if it does not fit well with 
other standards for identifying law.24 Nonetheless, any normative the-
orist would have to concede that some premises are so fundamental to 
our legal system, such as the primacy of the federal Constitution over 
conflicting state law, that a reasonable judge could not reject them. 
He would also have to concede that even were every particular stan-
dard for determining law theoretically subject to rejection, the bases 
21. See TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 23-45; LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 
15-20. 
22. See LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 136-39. 
23. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 5; Postema, supra note 5. 
24. In LA w's EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 138, Dworkin suggests that some things in British 
and American legal systems may be settled as a matter of genuine convention, but he says "noth-
ing need be settled as a matter of convention in order for a legal system not only to exist but 
flourish." 
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for judging the overall coherence of a challenged practice with the en-
tire law would be largely drawn from a wide collection of socially ac-
cepted practices. In sum, one cannot imagine any normative theory of 
law in which the law of a particular society could be identified wholly 
independently of socially accepted practices. Further, it would be 
highly surprising if these practices reflected just regularities of behav-
ior and convergences of perspectives among officials and citizens. Peo-
ple and officials rely upon the expectations created by concordant 
practice. Thus, a plausible normative, or interpretive, alternative to 
the conventionalist approach to determining law must involve a claim 
more subtle than the view that convention plays no role at all. 
Having endeavored to place Hart's account of the rule of recogni-
tion in its broader junsprudential setting, I undertake to apply that 
account to the United States, using his views about Britain as a guide. 
III. HART'S RULE OF RECOGNITION FOR BRITAIN: A STARTING 
POINT FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
When Hart focuses on the supreme criterion and the ultimate rule 
of recognition, he addresses himself to the relatively simple situation 
of Britain - at a time preceding its adherence to the Common Market 
and to other European agreements which permit multinational bodies 
to disallow some of their national legal norms. 25 From his discussion 
of Britain we learn more precisely what Hart means by an ultimate 
rule of recognition and a supreme criterion, and we prepare ourselves 
to tackle the more complicated legal terrain of the United States. 
The supreme criterion, on Hart's account, is that what the Queen 
in Parliament enacts is law.26 Any norm that emanates from other 
lawmaking authority and is in conflict with parliamentary legislation 
must give way to the legislation. Perhaps a more exacting statement of 
the supreme criterion would include a temporal dimension, indicating 
that earlier legislation yields to subsequent legislation, but the basic 
standard of parliamentary supremacy is straightforward. 
When we inquire what Hart conceives of as the ultimate rule of 
recognition in Britain, we must parse passages that lean in different 
directions. The problem arises over the legal status of custom and 
precedent. In one discussion, talking about the authority of parlia-
25. See Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, [1979) 3 All E.R. 325, 328-29 (C.A.) (Denning, M.R., 
dissenting); Esso Petroleum Co. v. Kingswood Motors (Addlestone) Ltd., (1974) 1 Q.B. 142, 151; 
Chloros, English Law and European Law: The Problem of Harmonization, 36 RABELS ZEIT-
SCHRIFT 601 (1972). 
26. THE CoNCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 103-04. 
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mentary legislation "as the ultimate rule of recognition,"27 Hart inti-
mates that in Britain the supreme criterion and the ultimate rule of 
recognition converge. Yet a few pages earlier, he denies that custom 
and precedent "owe their status of law ... to a 'tacit' exercise of legis-
lative power .... " 28 Rather, their status comes from "a rule of recog-
nition which accords them this independent though subordinate 
place."29 
One conceivable way to interpret these passages in conjunction is 
to suggest that although particular pieces of customary law and prece-
dent do not derive their status from parliamentary action or inaction, 
the criteria that give these norms authority have issued from Parlia-
ment in some way. Given Hart's analytical distinction between the 
ultimate rule and the supreme criterion, Parliament's power to alter or 
eliminate the legal status of custom or precedent is plainly not enough 
by itself to establish that the authority of these kinds of law emanates 
from Parliament; but perhaps when Parliament established courts, or 
circumscribed the jurisdiction of existing courts, it positively endorsed 
these forms of law. Hart, however, gives no hint that this is what he 
has in mind. More important, this version casts an unacceptable 
strain on his comment that custom and precedent have an independent 
place under the rule of recognition, which means that they do not de-
pend on some exercise of power by a legislative body. Particularly 
since the passages that suggest otherwise are addressed to different is-
sues, by far the most plausible rendering is that the ultimate rule does 
reach precedent and custom, that these are law in the United King-
dom because they are accepted as law by officials. 30 I shall take that as 
Hart's view when we address the more troublesome analogous ques-
tions about the United States. 
IV. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE ULTIMATE RULE OF 
RECOGNITION AND SUPREME CRITERION 
We are now ready to address the main subject of the article: What 
are the ultimate rule of recognition and supreme criterion for the 
United States? Many of the complicated questions center on the fed-
eral Constitution and its relationships to its own component parts and 
27. Id. at 104. 
28. Id. at 98. 
29. Id. 
30. This interpretation has been confirmed by a February 7, 1986, letter from Professor Hart, 
which characterizes as a "slip" the reference to "what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law" as 
the rule of recognition. 
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to state law. I deal with these•questions first and then consider judge-
made law and what I call interpretive techniques. 
When first asked, many students suppose that the federal Constitu-
tion is the ultimate rule of recognition for the United States, or that 
the rule of recognition is that "whatever is in the Constitution is law." 
Before suggesting why either of these notions, unvarnished, is inade-
quate, I consider the supreme criterion of law for the United States. 
A. A First Approximation: The Amending Clause as the Supreme 
Criterion 
With one obvious minor qualification, some important edges of un-
certainty, and a subtle point about institutional authority, the supreme 
criterion oflaw is rather easy to identify, given prevailing assumptions 
about the American Constitution. A criterion of law is supreme, it 
will be recalled, if norms adopted according to it take precedence over 
norms adopted by any other procedure. The criterion about which 
that is true in the United States is the amending clause, article V, of 
the Constitution. A provision adopted according to its procedures for 
amendment has priority not only over state law, federal statutes, and 
federal judicial decisions, but also over what is in the original Consti-
tution or in earlier amendments. 
The obvious minor qualification to this conclusion concerns the 
constitutional rule, found in the amending clause itself, that no state 
may lose its equal vote in the Senate without its consent. That rule is 
not amendable by the ordinary amending process. An exact statement 
of the supreme criterion would have to cover this specially entrenched 
practice,31 but I shall disregard this slight complication. 
1. Edges of Uncertainty 
The edges of uncertainty concern conceivable restrictions on per-
missible amendments, appropriate procedures, the status of norms not 
adopted according to ordinary procedures, and the passage of time. In 
contrast with India, where the supreme court has interpreted the con-
stitution as barring amendments that are incompatible with the basic 
structure of the constitution or that infringe certain fundamental 
rights,32 the dominant assumption in the United States is that amend-
ments adopted in a procedurally proper manner are valid regardless of 
31. Hart discusses unamendability briefly in THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 71; see 
also id. at 242. 
32. See, e.g., Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, 54 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1643 (1967); D.D. BASU, CON· 
STITUTIONAL LAW OF INDJA 371-77 (3d ed. 1983). 
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their substantive content. 33 Still, there may be limits. Perhaps an 
amendment cannot establish its own unamendability,34 or change the 
amending clause, or repeal all or most of the Constitution at one fell 
swoop. In Hart's terminology, there is a limited "open texture" in the 
supreme criterion; neither the language of the amending clause nor 
shared understandings of officials resolve the validity of every conceiv-
able provision adopted according to the procedures of the amending 
clause. 
Considerable doubts exist about what appropriate procedures are 
under article V. May states rescind ratifications?35 Can Congress set 
a time limit on ratification, and, if so, must it do so in an amendment 
itself?36 Does the time for ratification lapse if no limit has been set?37 
Under the yet-unused procedure by which a convention rather than 
Congress would propose amendments, can the convention's authority 
be limited to specific subjects if state legislative applications to Con-
gress to call a convention are so limited?38 Are all these matters genu-
ine legal questions or are they left to be decided by Congress on 
political grounds?39 
Finally, there may be uncertainties as to whether provisions may 
become valid law though understood not to be adopted by prescribed 
procedures. Bruce Ackerman has suggested that the reference in the 
preamble of the Constitution to "We the People" and the specification 
of a convention alternative for proposing amendments evidence a kind 
of approval for constitutional reforms that, like the original Constitu-
33. See, e.g., Dellinger, Constitutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 91 HARV. L. REv. 446, 448 
(1983); cf L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 13 (1985); Tribe, A Constitution We Are 
Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 91 HARV. L. REv. 433, 438-43 (1983) 
[hereinafter Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending]. 
34. This question lies close to one discussed by Hart about Britain - whether a present 
Parliament could adopt legislation and preclude repeal. In THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, 
at 145-47, Hart says that it is now clear that Parliament lacks this power, but that the related 
question whether it can entrench legislation against repeal by an ordinary legislative process 
remains open. 
35. See Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change.· Rethinking the Amendment Pro-
cess, 91 HARV. L. REV. 386, 421-27 (1983). 
36. Id. at 406-11. 
37. Id. at 424-27. 
38. See Dellinger, The Recu"ing Question of the ''Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 
YALE L.J. 1623 (1979). Article V also provides that Congress can provide for ratification by 
state conventions rather than state legislatures. I here disregard that alternative, used only in 
connection with the twenty-first amendment. 
39. On Congress' role, compare Dellinger, supra note 35, with Tribe, A Constitution We Are 
Amending, supra note 33. The view that final determination is committed exclusively to Con-
gress need not entail the view that the questions are not legal. One might think these are legal 
questions as to which the Court has no responsibility, that they are "political questions" only in 
the sense that judicial disposition is precluded. 
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tional Convention, leap the bounds of prescribed procedures.40 In this 
event, the Constitution itself might be viewed as conferring at least a 
quasi-legal status on some measures that would plainly be invalid if 
one asked only whether they were adopted according to set proce-
dures. Whatever their status prior to endorsement, "new amend-
ments" made by unprescribed means might become authoritative law 
if "promulgated" by Congress, published by the executive, or accepted 
over a period of time. If the Constitution can be validly amended by 
procedures that do not conform strictly with article V, but meet some 
standard of endorsement or of institutional support and public ap-
proval, the range of uncertainty about the supreme criterion is drasti-
cally increased. 
The possible import of acceptance over time for "amendments" 
not properly adopted relates to the continuing force of amendments 
that were properly adopted. For these, the passage of time may dimin-
ish the legal significance of their having been adopted in accord with 
the amending clause. I return to this problem after I discuss the ratifi-
cation clause. 
2. Institutional Authority 
The subtle point about institutional authority with respect to the 
supreme criterion concerns the role of Congress and the executive in 
approval of amendments, and the relationship between various stan-
dards different officials might use to determine what counts as law. 
Exactly what authority the political branches have in settling the va-
lidity of amendments is now far from clear, but the leading case on the 
amendment process indicates that, at least in respect to many issues, 
Congress makes the final decision whether an amendment has been 
properly adopted.41 
Before considering the jurisprudential implications of such a prin-
ciple, I need to narrow a bit the assumption that I am making about 
the range and nature of authority that may be assigned to Congress. 
Perhaps courts would balk at acquiescing in a blatant usurpation by 
Congress accomplished through a purported promulgation of a consti-
40. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 
(1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Storrs Lectures]. He develops these themes at much greater 
length in B. ACKERMAN, DISCOVERING THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming). 
41. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Four members of the Court indicated that Con· 
gress has undivided and exclusive control of the amendment process. 307 U.S. at 457 (Black, J,, 
concurring). Three Justices in an opinion for "the Court" indicated that courts could not review 
congressional determinations about timeliness and the significance of prior rejection; that opinion 
has fairly broad implications for what is committed to Congress. 307 U.S. at 447-56. 
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tutional amendment. 42 I am supposing only that within some range 
courts will take what Congress says as final. It is important that the 
position of the courts within this range is actually to assign final deci-
sion to Congress, not merely to give some deference to the judgment of 
Congress in the course of reaching an independent determination of 
whether an amendment has been properly adopted. Finally, the sort 
of judgment Congress is to make is important. I am assuming that, at 
least sometimes, Congress should make an essentially legal determina-
tion, one that will be followed by courts even if it is mistaken. I sup-
pose therefore that the authority assigned to Congress is something 
more than the right to make some nonlegal political judgment about 
whether acceptance of proposed amendments would be desirable, and 
something more than the right to fill in the open texture of the process 
outlined by the amending clause.43 The possibility I mean to examine 
is that within a certain spectrum Congress' determination whether an 
amendment has been properly adopted will be a determination con-
trolled by legal standards and will also be a determination accepted as 
final by the courts. I want to inquire how we would state the supreme 
criterion for such cases. 
From the point of view of Members of Congress viewing a pro-
posed amendment that has something approximating the requisite 
number of ratifications but is not published by the executive or yet 
promulgated by Congress,44 the supreme criterion is adoption accord-
ing to the amending clause. Whether that process has been followed 
will determine a conscientious Member's decision whether to promul-
gate, or let executive publication stand. The criterion for an amend-
ment that the courts actually use will be different: whether a provision 
has been published or promulgated as having been adopted in accord 
42. See Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending, supra note 33, at 433. 
43. The "political judgment" view supposes that legal standards require acceptance of ratifi-
cation in some situations and preclude acceptance in others, but that in certain borderline in-
stances Congress may make a determination based on the overall political wisdom of accepting 
ratification. In that event, the supreme criterion, properly understood, would indicate that in 
certain circumstances a proposed amendment may, but need not, be taken as having been rati-
fied. 
The "discretion to fill open texture" view is subtly different. It supposes that in certain situa-
tions the prescriptions of the amending clause, plus perhaps other relevant legal standards, are 
indeterminate in their coverage. In that event, someone must amplify the details of what counts 
as a proper ratification, and Congress is left this essentially legislative decision on how to fill in 
the gaps of existing legal standards (a type of "legislative" decision that is left to courts in most 
other areas of law). 
44. Although Coleman v. Miller indicates that Congress is to decide matters of ratification, in 
actuality virtually all amendments have been published by the executive branch, since 1818 ac-
cording to statutory authorization. See Dellinger, supra note 35, at 400-02. A view that assigns 
primary responsibility to Congress and purports to be in accord with historical practice must 
assume that Congress has implicitly accepted amendments that have been published by the exec-
utive without congressional involvement. 
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with the amending process.45 How to characterize such a principle of 
judicial acceptance of congressional determination is troublesome. We 
might say either that the supreme criterion for Congress really is dif-
ferent from the supreme criterion for courts, or that the courts do not 
apply a supreme criterion that, in some sense, they recognize. 
If Hart's notions of the ultimate rule and supreme criterion require 
that all, or virtually all, officials in their practical judgments really use 
the same standards for what counts as law, the theory indisputably 
requires emendation. For, once one thinks about this problem, one 
recognizes that many officials - most obviously lower-court judges 
and subordinate executive officials - are on many occasions expected 
to take as authoritative the judgments of other, often higher, officials 
as part of their final standards for what is law.46 Hart, in fact, recog-
nizes the possibility that legal systems may place some subjects outside 
of judicial competence.47 Although he does not explore the general 
significance for his theory of subordination and deference among offi-
cials, we must suppose that when Hart talks about official acceptance 
of an ultimate rule and a supreme criterion he does not mean that all 
officials use these directly in their decisions. 
The important practical point is fairly straightforward. So long as 
the principles of authoritative determination are reasonably clear and 
settled, a legal order can operate quite smoothly even though many 
officials often do not themselves apply the ultimate rule and supreme 
criterion used by the highest relevant officials. We might conceptual-
ize this conclusion by saying, with Joseph Raz, that within a legal or-
der there may be "various rules of recognition, each addressed to a 
different kind of officials";48 or we might understand the rule of recog-
nition as the ultimate standards of law used by officials who are not 
simply accepting the judgments of other officials. With sufficient ef-
fort, either sort of conceptualization could fit reality. Given the perva-
siveness of acceptance of judgments of higher officials, the latter 
course seems preferable; certainly it is more faithful to the overall 
spirit of Hart's treatment. 
45. This standard might also be used by subsequent Congresses, who would take initial pro-
mulgation or publication as determinative of validity. In that event, the present validity of nn 
amendment may be determined for all official bodies by acceptance by Congress nt a specific 
point in time. 
46. I use the phrase "on many occasions" because in the typical situation it matters whether 
the higher authority has reached a judgment. If it has not, the subordinate authority may apply 
the same standards to a problem as the higher authority would. If the higher authority has 
spoken, the lower authority takes its judgment as conclusive. 
47. THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note I, at 71, 242. 
48. J. RAZ, supra note 10, at 200. 
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In any complete account, we should need to explicate situations 
that are intermediate between wholly independent judgment and com-
plete acceptance of the judgment of another, situations in which one 
official body both gives considerable deference to another official body 
and regards itself as authorized to reject that judgment if the judgment 
is clearly enough mistaken. I address that problem when I discuss 
precedents and techniques of interpretation. 
As far as the supreme criterion is concerned, I shall assume for the 
time being that the supreme criterion, with appropriate qualifications, 
is the amending clause. In the ensuing discussion, I do not usually 
complicate matters by referring to whatever special authority Con-
gress may have with respect to the amending process. 
B. The Original Constitution and the Ratification Clause 
The tentative conclusion, qualified as it is, that the amending 
clause is the supreme criterion helps us to understand why the ulti-
mate rule of recognition does not include49 either the entire Constitu-
tion itself or the norm that whatever is in the Constitution is law. The 
amendments generally become valid law because they are adopted in 
accordance with the amending clause. The relationship between 
amendments and the amending clause is basically the same as that 
between particular laws and the authority of Parliament to enact laws. 
When one asks why a particular new amendment is valid law, one can 
take a step higher within the Constitution, to conformity with the 
amending process, to explain the amendment's validity. One need not 
simply refer to official acceptance of that amendment or of amend-
ments in general. The new amendment itself does not need to be justi-
fied by an ultimate rule of recognition that rests on acceptance, 
because it emanates from a process that is prescribed in an authorita-
tive legal document, the original Constitution. 
These observations about the amendments and the amending 
clause leave us with three initial candidates for formulations that indi-
cate how the Constitution relates to the ultimate rule of recognition: 
(1) All or part of the ultimate rule is the Constitution itself, in-
cluding the amending clause but excluding the amendments. 
(2) All or part of the ultimate rule is: Whatever the Constitution 
contains that is not itself enacted according to another part of the 
Constitution is law. 
49. My reason for using the phrase "does not include" is that some elements outside the 
federal Constitution turn out to be part of the ultimate rule of recognition. 
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(3) All or part of the ultimate rule is: Whatever has been 
adopted in accord with the ratification clause is law. 
Before turning to these three possibilities, I briefly address the lan-
guage of the Constitution's preamble. It says: "We the people ... do 
ordain and establish this Constitution .... " Reference to the people is 
not evidently presented as a legal standard ordinary officials can use to 
determine what is valid.50 Even if it is said that our country possesses 
a revolutionary heritage, and that we recognize the right of the people 
to overthrow an unjust government, the revolutionary principle is not 
a straightforward test of legality. Hart is always clear that the rule of 
recognition is a legal standard that judges and other officials can ap-
ply. Whatever "the people's" status as a matter of deep political phi-
losophy, "the people" or "the people's will" is not part of the ultimate 
rule of recognition for the legal order in the United States.51 
In considering the three possible formulations, I shall begin with 
the one involving the ratification clause of article VI, which states that 
upon ratification by nine states the Constitution becomes effective be-
tween those states. Since in proposing a new Constitution the mem-
bers of the Constitutional Convention exceeded the authority 
conferred on them to propose amendments to the Articles of Confed-
eration, 52 the chain of legal authority does not reach back prior to the 
Convention. In at least some sense, the main body of the Constitution 
owes its status as valid law to its ratification by the procedure the Con-
stitution contains. It would not have become law for this country if 
the proposed Constitution had remained unratified. Does the main 
body of the Constitution, therefore, stand in the same relation to the 
ratification clause as the amendments stand in relation to the amend-
ing clause? 
We need to consider three salient and related differences between 
the amending clause and the ratification clause. Unlike the amending 
clause, the ratification clause is a one-time-only matter. Were this not 
clear before the Civil War, it is now settled that a state that ratified the 
50. I do not claim that a reference to "the people" could never be such a standard. We could 
imagine a society in which judges could treat as invalid norms that did not accord with the views 
of the people, or one in which judges could even use determinations of the views of the people as 
a basis for establishing new norms. 
51. If Bruce Ackerman is right that the Constitution contains a kind of implicit approval of 
change in nonauthorized ways, see Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 40, then "We the Pco· 
pie" could play some role in determining the legal status of such changes. Suitably interpreted, it 
might be used by officials to determine whether or not changes brought about in procedurally 
imperfect ways should be taken as authoritative nonetheless. Were this so, the statement in the 
text would need to be qualified. 
52. As Ackerman notes, id. at 1017 n.6, an argument can be made that substantive changes 
as sweeping as those in the proposed Constitution were within the bounds of the Convention's 
authority; but the possibility of ratification by nine states clearly was not. 
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Constitution is not free later to withdraw. The second, more crucial, 
difference concerns the stage at which authoritativeness of the two 
clauses was established. The legal status of the amending clause pre-
ceded any amendments adopted pursuant to it. But the ratification 
clause had no status prior to the substance of what was to be ratified 
by it. And we cannot even be sure it was fully accepted as authorita-
tive until officials accepted the Constitution as effective law. Conceiv-
ably small states might have been favorably enough disposed to the 
Constitution to undertake the ratification process, but their officials 
might have hesitated to take the Constitution as governing law if ma-
jor states like Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania 
had failed to ratify. It is at least possible that the ratification clause 
was not fully accepted as authoritative until after the Constitution was 
ratified by nine states. 53 
The third important difference between the ratification clause and 
the amending clause is closely tied to the second. The ratification 
clause cannot be viewed apart from the substance of the Constitution. 
The clause does not prescribe a general procedure for lawmaking; 
rather it indicates that a particular group of potential legal norms will 
become law when nine states ratify. Let us assume that prior to actual 
ratification officials in the states did accept that, if the Constitution 
was ratified in their state and eight others, it would become authorita-
tive for their state. Following Hart's hierarchical chain, we might be 
tempted to say that the ratification process was accepted as one by 
which authoritative law could be made, and that the substantive provi-
sions of the Constitution were valid because ratified by that process. 
But such a statement might be misleading in a way that a statement 
about acceptance of the authority of Parliament would not be. It 
would be misleading because we do not know whether the ratification 
clause would have been accepted if the Constitution had had a very 
different substance. Since no state was bound to participate in the con-
stitutional union without its consent, the same principle of ratification 
by nine state conventions might have been widely accepted given very 
different substantive provisions, but we cannot be certain. All we can 
confidently say is that in the context of this Constitution the ratifica-
tion procedure was accepted. Here the procedure for making law and 
the law to be made are i~tertwined in a way not contemplated by the 
usual model of a rule of recognition. This analysis suggests that the 
53. See J. RAZ, supra note 10, at 138, criticizing Kelsen's concept of a basic norm that the 
makers of the original Constitution should be obeyed. Raz says a first Constitution can become 
law because it is part of an efficacious legal system, a fact that may not be determinable until after 
the Constitution is first issued. 
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acceptance of the ratification clause cannot be regarded independently 
of the body of the Constitution; and that the legal authority of the 
original Constitution derives from a procedure whose significance is 
best understood in conjunction with the rest of the Constitution. 
Whatever one concludes about the status of the ratification clause 
at the time of the Constitution's adoption, it almost certainly is not 
now any part of the ultimate rule of recognition. A judge might, to be 
sure, say that the Constitution is law because it was ratified - mean-
ing that from the historical point of view we would not have the Con-
stitution we do if the document had remained unratified. But no judge 
or other official would presently be likely to countenance a legal argu-
ment that an original state purportedly bound to comply with the 
Constitution had not ratified it properly. We may be hard put even to 
think of the kind of factual evidence that could cast an apparent ratifi-
cation into question. Are we to say that ratification is now not men-
tioned as of present legal significance because everyone assumes that 
the ratification procedure was followed, but that ratification still lies in 
the background as part of the ultimate rule of recognition? Or are we 
to say that now the legal authority of the rest of the original Constitu-
tion is established by its continued acceptance and that the original 
ratification procedure is no longer directly relevant to tracing what 
counts as law?54 The latter is almost certainly the more accurate mod-
ern characterization. 
C. A Reprise - Th~ Supreme Criterion and the Amending Clause 
This conclusion about the ratification clause requires some reas-
sessment of the relation of amendments to the amending clause. 
Whether any officials would look behind amendments of long standing 
to judge the validity of their ratification, or even the genuineness of 
executive publication, is highly doubtful. In contrast to the present 
role of the ratification clause, this point has practical significance. The 
reason is that serious questions can be raised about the original valid-
ity of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. 55 Both were pro-
posed by Congresses devoid of representatives from seceding states. 
Ratification of the thirteenth amendment depended on the approval of 
southern states whose representatives were excluded from the Thirty-
54. I put aside here the possibility that the manner in which the Constitution was ratified 
bears on how its provisions should be interpreted. 
55. The problems are discussed in great depth in B. ACKERMAN, DISCOVERING THE CON· 
STITUTION, supra note 40; the fourteenth amendment issue is summarized in Ackerman, Storrs 
Lectures, supra note40, at 1065-70;seealso A. KELLEY, W. HARBISON & H. BELZ, THE AMERI· 
CAN CONSTITUTION: !TS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 334-35 (1983). 
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Ninth Congress, a combination of events that powerfully casts into 
question whether the southern governments could be legitimate 
enough to ratify the thirteenth amendment and illegitimate enough to 
have representatives properly excluded from the Congress that pro-
posed the fourteenth amendment. The approval by southern states of 
the thirteenth amendment was achieved by strong presidential pres-
sure, and approval of the fourteenth amendment was a requisite to 
being represented again in the Congress. Arguments about the inva-
lidity of the amendments have failed in the courts56 but the Supreme 
Court generally is open to reexamining constitutional questions. 
Given earlier cases in which the Supreme Court has passed on the 
amendment process, 57 the diminished scope of the political question 
doctrine in recent decades, 58 and the especially troublesome aspect of 
federal coercion of state approval, it is possible that the Supreme 
Court would review the validity of a modern amendment ratified in 
circumstances similar to those surrounding the two amendments. 59 
Still, given the extent to which the Civil War amendments have be-
come part of the fabric of our constitutional order, it is unthinkable 
that the Court would now consider an argument that they were not 
properly ratified. The present authority of these amendments may de-
pend more on their acceptance for over a century than on their actual 
adoption by a process that may or may not now be thought to conform 
to what article V prescribes. Whatever the original source of authority 
of these constitutional standards may be, their present legal status, like 
that of provisions adopted under the original ratification clause, de-
pends more directly on acceptance than on how they were adopted; 
and the same may be true of old amendments originally adopted in an 
uncontroversial manner. 
Does this conclusion require a reformulation of the supreme crite-
rion? That depends on exactly what question is asked. If the question 
is what present method of lawmaking, if any, is superior to all other 
sources of law in the society, the answer is law made according to the 
amending clause (and perhaps law made by procedures that are close 
enough to those prescribed in the amending clause). Putting aside the 
constitutional rule of equal state votes in the Senate, a modern amend-
56. See, e.g., Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md. 1967), affd., 
391F.2d933 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Association of Citizens Councils, 187 F. Supp. 846 
(W.D. La. 1960); United States v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954). 
57. These are summarized in Dellinger, supra note 35, at 403·05. 
58. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
59. It is probably unrealistic to imagine "similar circumstances" without supposing similar 
cataclysmic political events, in which case ordinary judicial doctrines might have little relevance; 
but what the Court might actually do in a similar setting is not critical to my main point here. 
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ment would take priority over all conflicting legal rules. For this ques-
tion, no reformulation of the supreme criterion is needed. But if the 
question is what the source of authority is of that body of law that 
takes precedence over all others, then the answer needs to validate all 
unrepealed amendments. The present source of authority of that en-
tire body oflaw may not be limited to actual adoption according to the 
amending clause and promulgation by the political branches, but may 
include continued acceptance of provisions as valid amendments. A 
criterion of law designed to account for the present legal status of the 
body of amendments may need to be expanded to include the way in 
which continued acceptance can supplant adoption by a specific proce-
dure as the source of authority. 
D. How the Rule of Recognition Reaches the Constitution 
With these observations about the ratification and amending 
clauses, we can see that the status of old amendments in respect to the 
ultimate rule of recognition is less clear than I initially indicated. An 
amendment whose present validity derives from adoption by a pre-
scribed procedure does not depend directly on the ultimate rule of rec-
ognition. An "amendment" whose present authority rests on 
acceptance as an amendment may be part of the body of law that de-
pends more directly on the ultimate rule. 
We are now ready to reformulate and consider the remaining two 
candidates for how the Constitution relates to the ultimate rule of 
recognition: 
(1) All or part of the ultimate rule is the Constitution itself, in-
cluding the amending clause and any amendments whose present legal 
authority rests on acceptance, but excluding amendments whose pres-
ent legal authority rests on their adoption according to the amending 
clause; 
(2) All or part of the ultimate rule is: Whatever the Constitution 
contains, the present legal authority of which does not depend on en-
actment by a procedure prescribed in the Constitution, is law. 
Which of these formulations is to be preferred? There seems no 
practical difference between saying that much of the Constitution is at 
least part of the ultimate rule of recognition and saying that at least 
part of the rule is that what the Constitution contains, with some qual-
ifications, counts as law. Under either formulation, what is in the Con-
stitution is authoritative law, and no reference to some definitive legal 
source higher than the Constitution establishes that. 
From a conceptual perspective, the second formulation appears 
better, for two related reasons. First, saying that much of the Consti-
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tution is part or all of the ultimate rule is inelegant. It is difficult, 
though perhaps not impossible, to think of all the various parts of the 
original Constitution as a single complex rule for identifying what 
counts as law. We are more comfortable thinking of the Constitution 
as containing a substantial number of discrete rules. Moreover, while 
a sociologist might s~y that an ultimate source of legal authority is 
most of the provisions of the Constitution, it is awkward to think of 
officials as somehow accepting that set of provisions, when most offi-
cials, even judges, are not even aware of all the relevant provisions. 
Second, it is not mere coincidence that the standards of the Constitu-
tion are accepted as law; they are accepted because they are part of the 
Constitution. A formulation for all or part of the rule of recognition 
that focuses on what the Constitution contains better expresses this 
reality than simply saying that the provisions of the Constitution are 
accepted as law. Such a formulation states a rule that judges or other 
officials may reasonably employ to decide if a standard counts as law. 
There is one substantial worry about casting the ultimate rule in 
terms of what the Constitution contains counting as law. Recall that in 
connection with the ratification clause I urged that acceptance of pro-
visions adopted according to that procedure could not be divorced 
from the substance of the provisions proposed. One might say the 
same thing about an ultimate rule that what the Constitution contains 
is law. That rule may be accepted only because much of what the 
Constitution contains is, and has been, regarded as substantively 
sound or desirable. But the worry here about a misleading separation 
of form from substance is much less telling than the same worry about 
the ratification clause, because a rule cast in terms of what the Consti-
tution contains does not really suggest that very different provisions in 
the Constitution would also be accepted. So long as we understand 
that acceptance of a rule that what the Constitution contains is law 
cannot be detached from the substance of the constitutional provi-
sions, a formulation in terms of what the Constitution contains seems 
most appropriate. 
The discussion in this section permits us to draw some significant 
general conclusions. One concerns the relationship between the ulti-
mate rule of recognition and the supreme criterion. In The Concept of 
Law, Hart assumes that the supreme criterion will be either part or all 
of the ultimate rule of recognition. The preceding analysis has demon-
strated another possibility. That possibility would be most clearly re-
alized if the ratification clause were now considered a critical part of 
the rule of recognition. The amending clause would be valid law be-
cause adopted according to the ratification clause; it, therefore, would 
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not be part of the ultimate rule of recognition. The amending clause 
would remain the supreme criterion because norms adopted according 
to it would override other norms. Put more abstractly, the supreme 
criterion could derive its own authority from enactment in accord with 
the ultimate rule of recognition rather than constituting a part of that 
rule. Of course, if the ratification clause no longer has legal signifi-
cance, the present legal status of the amending clause does not depend 
on it. However, the derivative character of the supreme criterion re-
mains to a degree, if the correct present formulation of the ultimate 
rule of recognition is in terms of most of what the Constitution con-
tains, since the amending clause then owes its authority to being 
among the materials this ultimate rule treats as legal. 60 
Three other significant conclusions are closely related to each 
other. First, what was once all or part of an ultimate rule of recogni-
tion could lose its significance over time in a stable legal order. That 
may well have happened in respect to the ratification clause. Second, 
at many points in time in stable legal orders it may be hard to say how 
ultimate a criterion for identifying law is, because no one really knows 
if a norm may be challenged as invalid under a procedure everyone has 
been pretty sure was followed. Hart, himself, clearly recognizes that 
the ultimate rule of recognition in a stable legal order can have gaps. 61 
Also, in a discussion of England's relation to former colonies, he indi-
cates how the ultimate rule can change in a stable system as a break is 
made with the past. 62 But he does not draw attention to the possibility 
that subtle shifts over time concerning how high one can go in the 
hierarchy of legal authorization can lead to deep uncertainties about 
where derivation stops and acceptance begins within well-operating 
legal orders. The third conclusion follows from the second. A stable 
legal order can operate quite well even if relevant officials have drasti-
cally different opinions about where derivation from higher norms 
stops and acceptance begins. 63 To give a specific illustration, if three 
Justices believe that the fourteenth amendment is valid because prop-
erly adopted, three believe it counts as valid for the Supreme Court 
because promulgated by Congress, and three believe it is authoritative 
60. H.L.A. Hart drew my attention to this point in correspondence. The "derivation" is a 
little less sharp than if the ratification clause was critical under the ultimate rule, because, as 
indicated in the text, the substance of the Constitution is more closely intertwined with the idea 
that what the Constitution contains is law than with the idea that what is adopted in accordance 
with the ratification clause is Jaw. 
61. THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 120. 
62. Id. at 117-18. 
63. See Golding, Ke/sen and the Concept of 'Legal System,' in MORE EssAYS IN LEGAL PHI· 
LOSOPHY 69, 98-99 (R. Summers ed. 1971). 
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because so long accepted, they agree on its legal status, the point of 
practical legal significance which is now so obvious it is not litigated. 
I have explored the status of the federal Constitution in connection 
with original states. I assume that similar conclusions hold for the 
application of the Constitution in states admitted to the union, but I 
have not worked out that variation. 
V. STATE LAW AND THE RULE OF RECOGNITION 
Some reference to what is contained in the federal Constitution 
constitutes at least a crucial part of the ultimate rule of recognition. I 
now consider what, if any, standards outside such a reference are con-
tained in the ultimate rule. Since a standard for determining law is 
part of the ultimate rule only if it is not derivable from a higher legal 
standard, any standard for law that is derivable from the federal Con-
stitution is not part of the ultimate rule. 
One fundamental question concerns the authority of state law. I 
shall begin to address that question by imagining that the status of 
some state statute is in question months after the original Constitution 
has been ratified. The statute has been passed in proper form but a 
question has been raised whether the statute is within the authority of 
the state legislature to enact. We would initially look to the state con-
stitution to see if it authorizes that kind of legislation explicitly or im-
plicitly. Can we look yef higher to ascertain the source of the state 
constitution's legal authority? Certainly the federal Constitution sets 
limits on what state governments can do, so we need to examine 
whether the state constitutional authorization is compatible with the 
federal document and with federal legislation adopted under it. But 
the original federal Constitution does not actually confer power on the 
states; it only limits some powers they already have. The federal Con-
stitution also does not settle the legal status of the state's constitution; 
that depends upon the state constitution's having been adopted ac-
cording to procedures that already had approved legal status within 
the state, or former colony, or upon the constitution's being accepted 
by officials as containing the highest law in the state. For any original 
state, therefore, the ultimate rule of recognition would include either 
the procedural mechanisms by which the state constitution was 
adopted or a principle that much of what is contained in the state 
constitution is law. 64 Even as to state law, a reference to the federal 
Constitution would be a part of the ultimate rule of recognition, since 
64. I include the words "much of" to take account of amendments in a manner similar to 
that applying to the federal Constitution. 
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federal law contained in or authorized by the federal Constitution sets 
negative limits on the overall authority of state law. But the positive 
authority of state law could not itself be derived from the federal 
Constitution. 
The conclusion that for original states within the federal union the 
ultimate rule of recognition would not be limited to the federal Consti-
tution but would include references to state law is not altered by adop-
tion of the tenth amendment. That amendment does say that powers 
not delegated to the United States "are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people"; but this is an explication of an already im-
plied restriction on federal powers rather than a conferral of powers 
on the states.65 In a sense, the Constitution as a whole does, with the 
tenth amendment, outline the distribution of powers between state and 
federal governments, but that does not make the Constitution the legal 
source of state powers. 
An argument might be made that this original conception has 
shifted over time, that with the increase in federal power officials now 
conceive of state authority as derived from the federal Constitution. 
Further, with respect to states joining the union after 1789, their ad-
mission might be said to represent federal approval of the exercise of 
state powers within the union. Nevertheless, the federal Constitution 
and federal statutes authorized by it remain essentially a negative re-
straint on state power, barring some subjects from state involvement, 
precluding many outcomes otherwise within state authority, and de-
manding a republican form of government. 66 
Even if the authority of the states to act within their domains was 
actually conferred by the federal Constitution, it would not follow that 
the ultimate rule of recognition could be limited to federal law. The 
reason is that a general conferral of power to act need not prescribe 
the form of government by which action is taken. The federal Consti-
tution does not prescribe that all state authority must henceforth be 
exercised in accordance with an existing state constitution or legal suc-
cessors to that constitution. We might imagine a state analogue to the 
national transition from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitu-
tion. A state convention is called with authority only to propose 
amendments to the state constitution. Instead it proposes a wholly 
new constitution and a method of adoption that differs from the 
method of amendment of the existing constitution. The proposed new 
65. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
66. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Some states when admitted to the union had special restraints 
placed on state law as a condition of admission. Certain western states, for instance, were pre· 
eluded from having any law permitting polygamy. 
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constitution is "adopted" in the prescribed manner and all officials and 
citizens accept it as the authoritative state constitution. A sharp break 
in the chain of legal authority and a drastic shift in the standards for 
law within the state have occurred. But as long as a republican form 
of government and the federally vested rights of individuals have not 
been disturbed, 67 no violation of the federal Constitution has taken 
place. The possibility of such change shows that the present authority 
of particular state constitutions is not derived from the federal Consti-
tution, but from acceptance or from creation by means accepted 
within the state. The rule of recognition for any location within the 
fifty states must include state as well as federal law. 
VI. JUDGE-CREATED LAW: THE AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 
I turn now to the more perplexing problem of the authority of 
courts to make law and the techniques by which they interpret legal 
materials. For clarity of analysis, I have, somewhat artificially, distin-
guished the authority of precedent, discussed in this section, from the 
interpretive standards courts use, discussed in the next section. Since 
interpretive standards circumscribe the meaning and force of prece-
dents, these subjects are closely related, but it is initially helpful to 
regard precedents as legal rules created by courts, before attacking the 
complex questions about interpretive standards. 
By talking of precedents as law made by courts, I do not mean here 
to presuppose any controversial position about judicial power. Hart's 
view, shared by most American legal philosophers in this century and 
probably still dominant, is that courts have in some cases a kind of 
legislative discretion;68 as Cardozo put it, they legislate "between 
gaps."69 That view has been challenged by Ronald Dworkin,70 among 
others. 71 But even those who claim that there is a right answer to 
every legal case do not deny that if a highest court reaches the wrong 
answer, that answer can change the law. Mistaken precedents, if they 
are not too mistaken, are to be followed as law in future cases; and a 
related series of initially mistaken precedents can alter the law more 
67. I am assuming that a formal break in the chain oflegality would not be enough by itself 
for a citizen or official to mount a successful challenge under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. How one would describe the legal posture if revision did violate some vested 
rights, and federal courts recognized the legal effectiveness of the revision but required compen-
sation for the violated rights, would be complicated. 
68. See THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 121-50. 
69. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-14 (1921). 
70. See, e.g., TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 31-39. 
71. See, e.g .• R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS 181-210 (1975). 
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generally.72 That is enough to support the power of courts to create 
law in the sense I intend here. 
In discussing the significance for a rule of recognition of the force 
of precedent, I shall begin with common-law precedents, discussed by 
Hart, and then consider precedent in legislative and constitutional 
interpretation. 
A. Common Law 
In describing Hart's account for Britain, I considered whether ju-
dicial power to generate common law by precedent derives from 
higher standards within the law, or rests on acceptance and is there-
fore grounded in the ultimate rule of recognition. I asserted that 
Hart's view is definitely that the power rests on acceptance and is cov-
ered by the rule of recognition. The same issue arises for the United 
States, but its dimensions here are significantly different, because of 
our federal system, written constitutions, and "reception" statutes. 
If I am right that the authority of state law is not wholly derivative 
from the federal Constitution, the status of judicial lawmaking power 
is a question for both the federal and state aspects of a rule of recogni-
tion. One possibility is that written constitutions authorizing the crea-
tion or continued existence of courts impliedly confer on the courts a 
traditional power to make law, even though the relevant provisions do 
not specify how courts are to decide cases or what the significance of 
their decisions will be. The argument to this effect is essentially the 
same as the argument that a simple statute creating courts or confer-
ring jurisdiction approves traditional judicial power; but, since a con-
stitution represents a more comprehensive and deliberate view about 
desired institutions than a limited statute, the argument of implicit en-
dorsement has somewhat more power when it rests on a constitution. 
The argument is at its strongest when no courts existed in that juris-
diction before the constitution was adopted. That is true in respect to 
federal courts in the United States, which were authorized by article 
III and created by Congress in accord with that article. 73 Within 
states, courts are also typically authorized by constitutions and created 
by statutes, but many state courts predated statehood and some of 
these may have enjoyed a continuous existence up to the present. 
Many states also have in their constitutions or statutes "reception" 
provisions that receive the pre-Revolutionary common law of Eng-
72. Almost certainly the ways that courts formulate "correct" results also affect the law. 
That is a point little discussed by "law as discovery" theorists, but Dworkin briefly comments on 
the subject in LA w's EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 248. 
73. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73. 
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land;74 and a federal ordinance of 1787, which applied initially to the 
Northwest Territory and then to the states created out of that terri-
tory, gave judges within the territory "a common law jurisdiction."75 
The language of these provisions varies, but arguably they represent a 
more positive endorsement of judicial law-creating power than the 
mere setting up of courts. 
If we follow Hart's approach to the ultimate rule of recognition, 
the capacity of the legislature or the makers of constitutions to change 
the nature of judicial power does not itself entail that the legal status 
of judicial decisions derives from implicit authorization. What is criti-
cal is whether the authority of precedent derives from some more posi-
tive implicit authorization or rather, as Hart assumes about Britain, 
rests on acceptance by officials. In the latter event, the authority of 
precedent is part of the ultimate rule of recognition; otherwise it is not. 
As Hart obviously supposes, claiming that the status of precedent is 
impliedly conferred simply by the statutory or constitutional creation, 
or continuation, of courts is somewhat artificial. And even if the prac-
tice of giving some weight to prior decisions was thought to be inher-
ent in the practice of courts or implicitly approved by legislative 
action, that would not mean that the full law-creating power that com-
mon law courts now have has been authorized legislatively. Whether 
such authorization has been given by reception statutes, especially 
those like the Ordinance of 1787 whose reference to a "common law 
jurisdiction" may include a traditional law-creating power, is more 
difficult. 
Perhaps if one had to choose between authorization and accept-
ance as the basis for the law-creating power of judges in the United 
States, one might agree with Hart that acceptance is critical; 76 but the 
dichotomy that Hart assumes is itself somewhat artificial. Why can-
not we say that precedent has the status it does both because that sta-
tus has been and is presently accepted by concerned officials and 
because higher lawmaking authorities have obliquely indicated their 
approval? If one were trying to explain to a new judge why common-
law precedents count for a good deal, one would certainly say more 
about these higher lawmaking authorities than that they could have 
eliminated or altered judicial power and have chosen not to do so. 
Ordinary legislation dealing with courts does reflect a kind of implicit 
74. E.g., Mo. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. V; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1986); VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 1-18 (1979). 
75. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51 n.a. 
76. One would have to review all the relevant legal materials in a particular state to make a 
considered judgment for that state. 
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approval of present practices that bolsters those practices; and the sup-
port of many reception provisions is even stronger. It might be said 
that these implicit approvals only help explain why acceptance contin-
ues, but the point is that they help explain continued acceptance in a 
special way, indicating that references up in the hierarchy of norms 
are supportive of a subordinate feature of the ultimate rule of recogni-
tion. If so, acceptance by officials and derivation from higher norms 
may intertwine here in a way that Hart's sharp distinction of deriva-
tion and acceptance does not suggest. 
This is an insight that warrants generalization beyond the force of 
precedents. For example, it helps to show why the distinction between 
acceptance and derivation in respect to constitutional amendments is 
also misleading. At points in time, the legal status of particular consti-
tutional amendments might rest both on continued official acceptance 
as constitutional standards and on adoption by the procedure pre-
scribed under the amending clause. 
Once we understand how acceptance and derivation intertwine in 
respect to the status of precedents, our attention is drawn to the vari-
ous institutional aspects of a doctrine of precedent. In jurisdictions in 
which overruling of precedents is permitted, a particular precedent 
may carry more conclusive authority for a lower court, and perhaps 
for executive officials, than it carries for the court that has established 
it. And, since the operation of a legal system would be much more 
uneven if lower courts and executive officers felt free to disregard judi-
cial decisions they thought unsound than if the courts rendering the 
decisions felt free to depart from them, the argument that the estab-
lishment of a hierarchy of courts and of separate branches of govern-
ment implicitly points to affording authority to precedents may be 
strongest when one considers lower courts and executive officials. I 
shall not repeat these observations in connection with precedent in 
statutory and constitutional interpretation, to which I now tum, but 
they apply in those contexts as well. 77 
B. Statutory Interpretations 
Courts interpret legislation and reach controversial conclusions 
about the significance of statutory rules. Once a court interprets a 
statute to have a particular meaning, the court in a subsequent case 
will be hesitant to dep!lrt from that interpretation. That hesitancy rep-
77. There is a problem that deserves mention. When the highest court interprets statutory 
and constitutional materials, it might be argued that other officials accede to its decisions to 
avoid conflict, but do not necessarily concede that it has any genuine lawmaking power. See also 
note 80 infra. 
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resents the force of precedent in statutory cases. We might initially be 
inclined not to think of precedent in these cases as having any separate 
place in the rule of recognition, viewing the force of precedent here 
either as an adjunct of legislation itself or as an adjunct of the general 
common-law power of courts. But the subject cannot be disposed of 
so easily. 
The legislature gets its power from the constitution, and if courts 
are plainly supposed to apply legislation to concrete cases, it follows 
that they will have to interpret statutes. That essential responsibility 
may be conferred implicitly by the constitution. But neither the con-
stitution nor statutes tell courts how to do their job of interpretation, 
beyond occasional legislative injunctions to construe a statute "liber-
ally" or "according to the fair import of its terms." The status of 
precedents in statutory cases is not clearly approved in either constitu-
tions or statutes. The argument that the status is implicitly approved 
by the creation and continuation of courts is less powerful than the 
similar argument in respect to common-law precedents - because the 
role of precedents in statutory cases is even now less striking and less 
well recognized, and would have been a matter of much slighter signif-
icance in previous eras. 
The role of precedent in statutory cases does not follow ineluctably 
from the role of precedent in common-law cases, since one can imag-
ine courts adhering to precedents in common-law cases but not doing 
so in statutory cases. Let us imagine there are settled standards, say 
the apparent force of the statutory language in context or the intent of 
the legislature, 78 for interpreting a statute that has not received a prior 
relevant interpretation. A system of law could work reasonably well if 
the same court in a subsequent case applied exactly the same stan-
dards, following a precedent only insofar as the intrinsic force of its 
reasoning was persuasive and insofar as its continued existence could 
reasonably affect judgment about the legislature's actual aim.79 In 
such a system, precedents in statutory cases would have no inherent 
authority. Whatever the exact force of precedent in our system, I as-
sume that precedents count for more than the power of their reasoning 
and what they tell a subsequent court about legislative aims. This ex-
tra force of precedent may have developed and been accepted easily 
78. At a deep conceptual level there is controversy about appropriate standards for statutory 
interpretation, and each of these two candidates would require extensive explication to be de-
fended; but the oversimplified supposition in the text is sufficient to make the relevant point 
about precedent. 
79. If the legislature does not act contrary to a precedent, that may be some evidence (usually 
very weak) about what the legislature originally aimed to do, or about what the legislature 11ow 
wants to do, or both. 
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because of the place of precedent in common-law cases, but it is ana-
lytically distinguishable. 
Since an argument based on constitutional or legislative authoriza-
tion is actually weaker in respect to the precedential force of statutory 
interpretations than in respect to common-law precedents, the law-
making power of courts in statutory cases depends more clearly on 
acceptance than their lawmaking power in common-law cases. The 
rule of recognition for federal and state law must be formulated in a 
manner that gives this judicial power in statutory cases explicit recog-
nition or that casts the general power to create law by precedent in 
terms plainly broad enough to include statutory cases. so 
C. Constitutional Decisions 
What needs to be said about precedent in constitutional law resem-
bles closely what I have said about precedent in statutory cases. There 
are some special wrinkles, however, having to do with the weaker 
force of prior decisions in constitutional interpretation, the higher sta-
tus of constitutional law, and the possibly unauthorized status of some 
constitutional adjudication. 
Judicial opinions sometimes downplay the significance of prece-
dent in constitutional adjudication, and it is generally supposed that, 
because of the difficulties of constitutional amendment, courts do and 
should feel freer to overrule constitutional decisions than statutory 
and common-law decisions, whose rules can be corrected by simple 
legislation. Does pr~cedent have an independent place in constitu-
tional law, or are highest-court judges always seeking to make a "best" 
interpretation of the Constitution - best not depending at all on what 
a previous majority happens to have said? Once the issue is put this 
way, the answer is clear. Most Supreme Court Justices give at least 
some weight to precedent; if the legal question is a close one and the 
prior decision has not caused any serious injustice, Justices will not 
overturn a prior holding even if they might have reached the contrary 
result in the original case. When a line of decisions becomes an impor-
tant part of the fabric of the law, Justices will be even more hesitant to 
overrule prevailing doctrine, though that happens occasionally. Thus 
80. One might try to avoid this conclusion by arguing that as far as statutes are concerned, 
the standard for what counts as law is statable quite independent of precedents, and the force of 
precedent merely reflects deference to the original deciding court. Since the power of precedent 
is so similar in common-law and statutory cases, this argument seems an evasion; but the prob-
lem does show how subtle the difference is between saying: (I) Official Body A has a law·creating 
power; and (2) Official Body A has no law-creating power but its determination about what the 
law is will be deferred to by other official bodies, including A at a later date. See also note 77 
supra; notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text. 
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precedents do matter in constitutional adjudication, and judges in 
cases posing new and difficult issues have a kind of lawmaking power. 
On what basis does this power rest? Let us first assume that there 
is no doubt that courts are supposed to engage in substantive constitu-
tional interpretation. As far as the federal courts and federal Constitu-
tion are concerned, such authority is fairly inferred from the 
Constitution in respect to constitutional challenges to state laws. 81 
But the authority to interpret does not necessarily establish the status 
of precedents. A system of constitutional interpretation, like a system 
of statutory interpretation, could conceivably work if prior decisions 
had no independent force. Conferral of a power to interpret does not 
represent a judgment by those who made and approved the Constitu-
tion in favor of according force to constitutional precedents. Thus, 
this force neither rests directly on the Constitution nor follows inexo-
rably from the force of precedents in common-law cases. The ultimate 
rule of recognition must include the force of precedents in constitu-
tional cases. 
Constitutional decisions have a higher status than both legislation 
and common law. Sii}.ce officials generally treat a constitution as say-
ing what the highest judges say it says, the power of courts to make 
constitutional law by decisions might initially be thought to be an as-
pect not only of the ultimate rule of recognition but also of the 
supreme criterion, that is, an aspect of the form of law that takes pri-
ority over all other forms of law. 
That view would be mistaken, however. Since new constitutional 
amendments can override judicial interpretations of the Constitution, 
the legal force of constitutional interpretations is not part of the 
supreme criterion of law. 
Any doubts about the courts' original constitutional authority to 
engage in substantive constitutional interpretation merely strengthen 
the conclusion that the force of constitutional precedents rests on ac-
ceptance. Although Marbury v. Madison 82 solidly established the 
power of the Supreme Court to pass on the constitutional validity of 
federal laws, some have argued, contrary to my own view, that the 
true purport of the federal Constitution was not to authorize such ju-
81. The supremacy clause of article VI requires state courts to treat federal law, including the 
federal Constitution, as the "supreme law of the land." If a claim is made that a state law 
violates the federal Constitution, a state court must interpret the federal Constitution to resolve 
the conflict. Since it would be senseless to have federal courts resolving such cases on a wholly 
different basis from state courts, federal courts must be supposed to have a similar authority, and 
duty. 
82. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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dicial determinations. 83 If the practice of judicial review of federal 
legislation lacked authority in the original Constitution, the develop-
ment of the authority to interpret rested only on acceptance of offi-
cials. Even in this case, it might be argued that more recent 
constitutional amendments presuppose such authority and therefore 
confer on it a kind of constitutional support. Here again, we would 
face a difficult problem about when derivation ends and acceptance 
begins; and a realistic resolution might claim that the present power to 
interpret the Constitution in challenges to federal laws rests both on 
acceptance and implied approval by higher lawmaking powers, the 
amenders of the Constitution. To summarize, so far as the authority 
to interpret rests on acceptance, the force of precedent also rests on 
acceptance; but even if the authority to interpret rests wholly or partly 
on implicit authorization by higher lawmakers, the force of precedent, 
as I have suggested, does not flow from that alone and is an aspect of 
our law because of acceptance. 
VII. INTERPRETIVE STANDARDS 
Our last subject for analysis is the interpretive standards judges use 
to resolve cases. When judges determine the significance of authorita-
tive constitutional or statutory language or decide the reach of the 
common law, they employ techniques of reasoning and particular cri-
teria of evaluation that are critical aspects of legal adjudication. 
Among these standards are notions like: "constitutional language 
should be interpreted in accord with the intent of those who framed 
and adopted it"; "penal statutes should be strictly construed"; and "no 
person should profit from his wrongdoing." 
Dworkin's challenge to the whole idea of a rule of recognition rests 
largely on the place of such standards. 84 In brief, he claims that these 
standards are not typically given legal validity by a single authoritative 
act;85 their status rests on more complicated facts of institutional ac-
ceptance and consonancy with other materials of the legal system. 
Dworkin suggests that an explanation of the authority and weight of 
many interpretative principles defeats any easy distinction between de-
rivative validity and acceptance and shows that no straightforward 
standard indicates what principles count in the law and for how 
83. I do not pause to analyze the intermediate possibility that courts could apply the Consti-
tution, but that other branches, except in enforcing judgments, would not take judicial construc-
tions as authoritative. I discuss the authority of Supreme Court decisions for the political 
branches in Constitutional Decisions and the Supreme Law, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 145 (1987). 
84. See, e.g., TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 14-130. 
85. I say "typically" because statutes in this country do frequently contain some principles 
for their own construction. 
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much. 86 He claims, moreover, that in respect to these matters, judges 
do not even employ a commonly shared standard. Each relies on what 
seems to him or her the soundest approach, the one that best interprets 
the whole corpus of legal materials. Each judge makes essentially nor-
mative judgments; he does not try to ascertain some socially accepted 
rule and follow it. Here lies the heart of Dworkin's thesis that the 
criteria of law are normative, not conventional. 87 
Having this sketch in mind is helpful as we consider the status of 
interpretive standards. I shall concentrate here on interpretative stan-
dards in constitutional cases, though, with slight modifications, the 
conclusions I draw apply to common-law and statutory interpretation 
as well. 
For illustrative purposes, I shall use an interpretive standard that 
can be drawn from Supreme Court cases establishing that wiretapping 
and electronic eavesdropping are practices covered by the fourth 
amendment. 88 The standard, roughly put, is that the concepts of 
"search" and "seizure" in the fourth amendment should be flexibly 
interpreted in light of changing technologies and the evils the amend-
ment was designed to prevent. It is evident that discrepancies in inter-
pretive strategies can yield different conclusions about what the 
Constitution requires. Justice Black's more rigid approach to practices 
covered by the fourth amendment, for example, produced dissents in 
the wiretapping and eavesdropping cases. 89 Thus the determination of 
interpretive strategy is an important aspect of judgment about what 
the law provides. 
Whether every standard of interpretation that constrains judges 
should be characterized as a "legal" standard is doubtful. 90 Some 
standards of interpretation, such as that ordinary words should be ac-
corded their natural meaning absent some reason to do otherwise, are 
general and fundamental to all interpretation of language; but other 
standards are distinctly legal. Whether standards are distinctly legal 
86. See, e.g., TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 41. According to Dworkin each 
interpretive principle counts for a decision one way or another, but each does not dictate the 
decision in every instance to which it applies. Thus, in a common-law case, a court might give 
some weight to the principle that a person should not profit from his wrongdoing and still allow 
the wrongdoer to win to his profit. How much weight to assign competing principles in context 
is an important aspect of adjudication. 
87. The account given here is meant to be faithful both to Dworkin's earlier work and to his 
recent systematic statement in Law's Empire, supra note 4. 
88. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
That constitutional interpretive standards cannot be excluded from a rule of recognition is em-
phasized by Richard Kay, who in fact accords them a more prominent place than I do. See Kay, 
Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981). 
89. Berger, 388 U.S. at 70, 78-81; Katz. 389 U.S. at 364-74. 
90. See Soper, supra note 5, at 488-98. 
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or not, so long as judges are bound to follow them in deciding what 
the Constitution means, the standards need to be accorded some place 
among ultimate or derivative criteria for determining law. Perhaps 
general and fundamental standards for interpretation of language are 
already implicit in the idea that what the Constitution contains is law, 
but that could not be said for any distinctly legal standards whose 
status does not derive from the Constitution itself. 
In considering the status of interpretive standards, I address the 
relevance of the Supreme Court's flexible approach to "search" and 
"seizure" for a new "X-ray vision" device that "sees" clearly through 
solid walls.91 We might initially be inclined to say that whatever stan-
dards are now prevailing rest on acceptance and are part of the ulti-
mate rule of recognition. But to speak in this manner could be doubly 
misleading. First, there is no guarantee that most Justices will adhere 
to the "dominant standards." Each Justice of the Supreme Court will 
actually employ a set of interpretive strategies that is at least subtly at 
variance with the strategies of any other Justice. And, as the next 
section explores, as to some questions the "dominant" interpretive 
strategy may represent a composite of views. Second, it is an open 
question how much weight a Justice will accord to a prevailing point 
of view because it occupies that status. Justices who do adhere to a 
dominant strategy need not do so because they take any prevailing 
standard as legally authoritative. A Justice who conforms to a domi-
nant strategy might do so because he or she thinks it is normatively 
correct, regardless of what other judges now assume or have assumed. 
The question of authoritative status is most sharply posed when 
there is some clear difference in interpretive approach, as might be 
perceived by a new Justice, Carolyn Gray, who is passing on the "X-
ray vision" device and who thinks that Justice Black had the better of 
the argument in the original wiretapping and eavesdropping cases. 
We can very roughly imagine four possible positions. Justice Gray 
might feel constrained to accept prevailing interpretive standards as 
absolutely binding; she might consider the prevailing interpretive stan-
dard to be as binding as a clear line of constitutional precedents; she 
might suppose that the prevailing interpretive standard carries some 
weight, but less than would a clear line of precedent; or she might 
believe that whether a standard is prevailing or not carries no signifi-
cance, her responsibility being to determine the best set of interpretive 
standards without deference to what past cases say or the rest of the 
present Justices think. 
91. The device mechanically achieves what Superman has always been able to do. 
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We can initially rule out the first possibility; all Justices believe it is 
sometimes appropriate to alter previously prevailing standards of in-
terpretation. At least for many matters we can also rule out the last 
possibility. Most Justices suppose that it makes some difference what 
prevailing standards are. At least when an issue of interpretive strat-
egy is regarded as close or a Justice is unsure of the correct strategy, 
he or she is likely to go along with a clear prevailing standard that has 
received majority support. 
Generalizing between the second and third possibilities is compli-
cated by the open-endedness of many relevant formulations of how 
judges should interpret, by different levels of interpretive standards, 
and by variations in the degree of firmness with which standards are 
settled; but we can say that prevailing interpretive standards typically 
exercise less constraint than clear precedents that establish rules of 
law. A Justice would feel freer to abandon the flexible approach to 
new technology in interpreting the fourth amendment than to overrule 
the cases applying the amendment to wiretapping and electronic 
eavesdropping. That a standard of interpretation prevails does make a 
difference, but even such a standard does not bind as strongly as au-
thoritative constitutional or statutory materials or even as strongly as 
typical precedential rules of law.92 
This analysis of standards of constitutional interpretation yields 
some important conclusions. The Concept of Law conveys the idea 
that the set of ultimate criteria for identifying law might vary in length 
from a sentence to a paragraph. Trying to state ultimate criteria that 
account for prevailing standards in constitutional, statutory, and com-
mon-law interpretation leads to difficulties in one of two directions. 
Either aspects of the criteria of recognition are cast in the simple circu-
lar and uninformative way that accepted standards of interpretation 
are part of the law,93 or the standards themselves must be described. 
In the latter event, the ultimate criteria might stretch to volumes and 
require constant alteration with every subtle shift in prevailing 
standards. 
Another important conclusion concerns the relation between the 
prevailing standards and what an official within the system should do. 
92. Of course, since one critical question of constitutional Jaw interpretation is how much of 
precedents on particular issues are to be taken as binding, and how the precedents are themselves 
to be interpreted, differences and uncertainties about standards of interpretation infect the signifi-
cance and weight of precedents. Though Justices may generally agree that precedents count as 
law in some sense, they may differ considerably in their understanding of what that entails. 
93. As Dworkin suggests in A Reply, supra note 4, at 248, Hart's discussion of a possible 
ultimate rule for international law is unsupportive of simple circular rules of recognition. See 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 228-29. 
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Hart assumes that a sociologist's description of the ultimate rule of 
recognition will coalesce with the standards a loyal official would em-
ploy. But we can see that a follower of Justice Black who thought the 
majority's approach badly misguided might loyally continue to em-
ploy what she regarded as the best interpretive strategy for the fourth 
amendment even while recognizing that she was in the minority. Ifwe 
thought a rule of recognition had to be accepted by virtually all offi-
cials as binding on all relevant officials, we might at this point say 
there is no rule of recognition that covers flexible or rigid interpreta-
tion of "search and seizure." If, on the other hand, we adopted the 
more modest notion that a "rule of recognition" can consist of pres-
ently prevailing ultimate criteria for identifying law, we might say that 
the generally accepted flexible approach is embraced by the ultimate 
rule. But we would then have to concede that the rule in this respect 
does not sharply constrain those who disagree with the flexible 
approach. 
This point illustrates Dworkin's claim that judges developing com-
plex interpretive strategies are not just seeking to ascertain what stan-
dards are now prevailing but what standards are best. However, 
Dworkin errs in not acknowledging how significant it may be for a 
judge whether an interpretive strategy is prevailing.94 The same rea-
sons of coordination that lead judges to join majority opinions that do 
not precisely represent their own views lead them to adhere to prevail-
ing interpretive standards that are not exactly the ones they would 
have adopted. 
Prevailing interpretive strategies, like precedents, affect the deci-
sions of lower-court judges and nonjudicial officials. As I indicated 
with respect to precedents, the force of prevailing standards and the 
extent to which a principle of authoritativeness can be implicitly de-
rived from constitutions and statutes may vary among different kinds 
of officials. I shall not repeat that analysis here. 
VIII. THEORETICAL LESSONS 
The main effort of this article has been to apply Hart's theory re-
garding an ultimate rule of recognition to the United States. The in-
sights generated by this effort allow enrichment of Hart's theory and 
illuminate some strengths and weaknesses of Hart's conventionalist 
account. In this final section, I recapitulate my major findings and 
comment on broader theoretical concerns. 
94. But see LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 248. 
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A. A Rough Approximation of the Rule of Recognition for 
Someplace Within the United States 
659 
This whole exercise has demonstrated the immense difficulty of de-
termining what is the appropriate rule of recognition in the United 
States. I shall here take the standpoint of a sociologist studying what 
counts as law within the American legal system and framing a rule of 
recognition with respect to the highest body that will determine a legal 
question. With qualifications indicated in the relevant sections, I have 
concluded that the supreme criterion of law is the amending clause of 
the federal Constitution, and that within one of our states the ultimate 
rule of recognition, cast in hierarchical order, is approximately this: 
(1) Whatever is in the federal Constitution, that has not lost its 
legal force and does not derive its present legal force from enactment 
by a prescribed constitutional procedure, is law; 
(2) On matters not clear from the text, the prevailing standards 
of interpretation used by the Supreme Court determine what the Con-
stitution means,95 and Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Con-
stitution establish precedential law;96 
(3) On matters not clear from statutory texts, the prevailing stan-
dards of interpretation determine what congressional legislation 
means, 97 and Supreme Court decisions interpreting that legislation es-
tablish precedential law; 
(4) Prevailing standards of interpretation for common-law sub-
jects determine federal law for those,98 and Supreme Court decisions 
on such subjects establish precedential law; 
(5) Whatever is in the state constitution (or whatever was 
adopted in accordance with an accepted constitution-making proce-
dure), that has not lost its legal force and does not derive its present 
legal force from a procedure prescribed in the existing constitution, is 
law; 
( 6) On matters not clear from the text, the prevailing standards 
95. This formulation falls into the vice of circularity noted above. See note 93 supra and 
accompanying text. That vice could be avoided by extensive specification of prevailing 
standards. 
96. I am unsure whether the power to make law by precedent is best folded into interpretive 
standards generally or treated independently. A more complete statement might have to include 
the place of precedents established by lower courts on issues not resolved by the Supreme Court. 
97. The authority of the legislature itself is not included because that is derivative from the 
Constitution. I am assuming that most interpretive standards and the authority of precedent in 
statutory cases are not so derivative. 
98. Despite the absence of a federal common law, there may be a "common law" for federal 
government contracts, for torts committed by federal officers, and for admiralty cases, among 
others. The federal "common law" in such cases can override conflicting state law. 
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of interpretation used by the highest state court determine what the 
state constitution means, and decisions of that court interpreting the 
state constitution establish precedential law; 
(7) On matters not clear from statutory texts, the prevailing stan-
dards of interpretation used by the highest state court determine what 
state legislation means, and decisions of that court interpreting that 
legislation establish precedential law; 
(8) Prevailing standards of interpretation determine the reach of 
the common law, and decisions of the highest state court establish 
common-law precedents; 
(9) Customs meeting criteria of legal bindingness constitute cus-
tomary law. 
This summary attempts to state the standards of law that officials 
rely on that are not themselves derivable from some higher legal norm 
but rest on acceptance. The inclusion of custom here is of minor im-
portance, but it incorporates a point made by Hart: that certain cus-
toms may be established in a way that makes them legally binding 
before a court declares them to be so.99 I have not reiterated all the 
complexities one would need to introduce to meet obvious objections 
to any formulations made in even this simple a way. The rest of this 
section, like the preceding sections, sheds some light on those 
complexities. 
B. More General Possibilities 
This article has demonstrated at least ten possibilities that are 
omitted or underdeveloped in Hart's account. 
The first possibility is that not only may a rule of recognition have 
gaps (a point Hart does emphasize), but there may also be deep uncer-
tainty for someone tracing the legal status of a norm as to when one 
ascends above the authority of the last relevant higher legal norm and 
reaches the relevance of acceptance. Particularly when it has long 
been assumed that a higher norm does confer legal status on an impor-
tant norm like a constitutional amendment, one may not know 
whether conformity with the higher norm remains crucial to the valid-
ity of the other norm. 
The second possibility, closely related to the first, is that over time 
in a perfectly stable legal order the point of ultimacy may shift radi-
cally, despite the absence of any clear change at any particular stage. 
99. THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note I, at 44-48, 98. I have omitted custom for federal 
law, though a custom might arise that would have legal effect in the limited areas of federal 
common law. 
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What was once law because adopted by a certain process may now be 
law because it has been so long accepted as law. 
The third possibility, tied to the previous two, is that a system may 
be stable even if officials occupying the same position, say Supreme 
Court Justices, have variant notions of the point of ultimacy for the 
authority of some legal standards. 
The fourth possibility is that differences in role may sharply affect 
what ultimate rules of recognition officials actually use. The working 
rule of recognition for highest court judges may look very different 
from the working rule of recognition for a police sergeant even when 
those working rules are fully compatible. 
The fifth possibility is that some standards for what counts as law 
may be inextricable from what has been proposed as law under these 
standards. The point is clearest with respect to the original Constitu-
tion and a rule that what is adopted under the ratification clause is 
law, or a rule that what the Constitution contains is law; but it is also 
possible that other officials accept the results of judges' interpretive 
strategies only because they fall within a widely tolerable range. 
The sixth possibility is that as to some standards for authoritative 
norms, such as state constitutions, negative constraints on what they 
may provide come from one kind of higher norm, the federal Constitu-
tion, while positive endorsement of their status comes from either an-
other higher norm, such as a prior procedure within the state for 
adopting a constitution, or from acceptance. 
The seventh possibility is that the authoritative status of some 
norms, such as common-law rules and interpretive strategies estab-
lished by judicial decision, depends both on oblique approval by higher 
norms and on acceptance. 
The eighth possibility is that, as to some crucial and ultimate crite-
ria of law, judges are not mainly asking what is generally accepted but 
are seeking what are the best possible criteria conceived in some other 
way. This possibility, urged by Dworkin, is most obviously realized 
with respect to interpretive criteria. This possibility shows that what a 
sociologist might describe as law within a society might not conform 
exactly with what any particular loyal official might take as law. 
The ninth possibility is that the ultimate rule of recognition may be 
very long. If judges largely agree on correct interpretive standards but 
do not agree on a principle that prevailing standards should be fol-
lowed, a noncircular statement of the ultimate rule may require speci-
fication of all relevant accepted standards. 
The tenth possibility is that the supreme criterion of law need not 
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be a part of the ultimate rule of recognition; rather it may be derived 
from that rule. 
We may be confident that these possibilities are not restricted in 
their importance to the United States. If, for example, we reflected on 
Hart's own account of English law, we might find that he has not 
adequately explained the status of the principles courts use to interpret 
legislation and common-law precedents, that his clean dichotomy be-
tween legislative authorization and acceptance is too simple in respect 
to the status of common-law precedents, and that the present legal 
authority of ancient statutes rests on their having been accepted so 
long as law, not on the actual manner of their adoption. 
C. The Virtues of Mixed Conventional and Normative 
Accounts of Law 
Some of these possibilities can easily be incorporated into Hart's 
theory, but others pose serious difficulties. A number of them, the 
eighth most directly, raise the question whether judges who are seek-
ing to determine the law exhaust the sources of law when they have 
ascertained whatever clear implications can be drawn from any higher 
legal norms and from any generally accepted ultimate norms of what 
counts as law. If we take a simplistic view of Hart's conventionalist 
account, we might conclude that when the answer these sources pro-
vide to a question is not reasonably evident, "the law" does not answer 
the question. Now, such a view might represent a satisfactory ap-
proach for a sociologist, but it is hardly adequate for a judge. Judges 
conceive of themselves as constrained by the law even when no widely 
accepted social rule includes such a constraint. At least to this degree, 
an approach with important normative elements provides a more com-
pelling account of an insider's view than the simple conventionalist 
approach I have just sketched. Whether or not Dworkin's claim that 
the law provides an answer to every case is correct, and whether or not 
insiders suppose that the law provides such an answer, an account 
with critical normative elements can show why officials often consider 
themselves as legally bound even though no clear derivation from 
higher norms is possible and no socially established rule indicates they 
are bound in the way they suppose.100 
An undiluted normative account, however, seems no sounder than 
a simple conventionalist account for explaining legal interpretation, 
unless it is rich enough to pay attention to the great importance of 
100. An account with normative elements may also handle more comfortably the ways in 
which higher norms can obliquely support practices without explicitly authorizing them. 
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shared practices and conventions. As I suggested early in the article, a 
normative account must build from conventionally accepted standards 
of what obviously counts as law. Further, even on debatable matters 
such as interpretive strategies, it does matter what the prevailing view 
is in our system, and it matters because judges recognize the social 
advantage of employing shared standards. Prevailing standards, like 
precedents, ordinarily exert some normative force because they permit 
coordinated activity by officials and have generated reasonable expec-
tations among citizens. A plausible normative account must accord 
convention its proper role, and it is difficult to imagine many legal 
systems for which this role will not be significant. A "descriptive" 
normative account, one that describes how officials behave, must indi-
cate how far social acceptance does figure in the normative evaluations 
judges and other officials make; a "prescriptive" normative account 
must elaborate how far social acceptance should figure in normative 
evaluations for judges. 
In trying to develop a satisfactory account of law that appropri-
ately treats both normative and conventional elements, one can use-
fully distinguish an outsider's, or sociologist's, view from that of a 
participant who must actually decide what the law is. It is no coinci-
dence that Hart, while emphasizing the "internal point of view" taken 
by officials, has been mainly interested in the former and Dworkin the 
latter. Because convention looms larger in a sociologist's view of law 
than a participant's, and normative elements are more central for a 
participant, Hart's focus has led him to stress convention, and Dwor-
kin's focus has led him to concentrate on normative evaluation. 
1. The Sociologist's Account 
I shall start with the sociologist, who is interested in describing. 
He wants to differentiate law from other social phenomena. For a 
modern legal system, he wants to identify norms that are part of the 
system of norms adm_inistered by officials and backed by the state's 
coercive power. His account of a society's law would include all the 
norms that are undeniably part of this system. Since he cares about 
norms that are practically part of this system, 101 his account of the 
standards by which law is identified would be based on the standards 
prevailing among the relevant officials. In respect to legal questions 
about which the relevant officials are uncertain or sharply divided, he 
101. An outsider may, of course, be interested in reconstructing the basic values implied by 
legal materials and showing how practical administration has departed from these. Such an 
outsider may wish to give a more normative account of what constitutes the law. I am assuming 
that the typical social scientist has the interests ascribed to the sociologist in the text. 
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might well say that the law is undetermined or not settled. What has 
been said so far about this "social fact" account of law is quite close to 
Hart's theory, but we need to pay attention to some complexities that 
show that this sociologist's account differs from the simple conven-
tionalist account I sketched a moment ago. 
First, we must recognize that a standard for determining law could 
be a "prevailing standard" without being generally shared, or even 
shared by a majority. A stark illustration is when a standard is ap-
plied by a key group in the center. For a period in the 1960s and 
1970s, for example, a minority of Supreme Court Justices thought that 
communication could be punished by states as obscene only if it ap-
pealed predominantly to the prurient interest, was patently offensive, 
and was utterly without redeeming social value.102 Some Justices to 
the "left" thought no speech could be punished as obscene103 or that 
the appropriate standard was more "speech protective" than the three-
fold test;104 some Justices to the "right" thought that the appropriate 
test was less "speech protective.''105 The "threefold" test was prevail-
ing because its application by the Justices who accepted it determined 
the outcome of cases, although a majority of Justices did not accept or 
apply that test. 
On more complicated interpretive matters, like the appropriate 
weight accorded precedent, each Justice may apply an approach subtly 
different from that of every other Justice. In that event, the "prevail-
ing standard," hard as it would be to formulate, might be a kind of 
distillation of a number of standards that would not itself track exactly 
the approach of any s_ingle official. 
In an extreme case, the prevailing standard might combine ele-
ments actually rejected by every single official. Suppose, to oversim-
plify in a schematic way, that three Justices thought neither element A 
nor element B bore at all on whether a norm was law, three Justices 
thought element A was sufficient to make a norm law and that element 
B was irrelevant, and three Justices thought that element B was suffi-
cient and element A irrelevant. The practical prevailing standard 
would be that, absent other lawmaking features, norms are law only if 
they combine elements A and B, even though this standard is at odds 
with the standard applied by every Justice.106 
102. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
103. See Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 424-33 (Douglas, J., concurring); Ginzburg v. United States, 
383 U.S. 463, 476-82 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
104. See Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 497-501 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
105. See Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 441-55 (Clark, J., dissenting), 455-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
460-62 (White, J., dissenting). 
106. Cf. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). 
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Employment of a "prevailing standard" approach would permit 
the sociologist to inform another person what criteria norms must sat-
isfy to be treated as law within the system, and to predict the outcome 
of cases as to which application of a prevailing standard is clear. 107 
For some genuinely novel issue, like the fourth amendment's applica-
tion to the "X-ray vision" device, the sociologist might undertake sub-
stantial normative elaboration to decide how Justices adhering to 
given standards would treat this new issue. Insofar as the sociologist 
engages in a normative appraisal using prevailing standards, his effort 
will resemble that of actual Justices. But the sociologist is still not 
concerned with what interpretive standards Justices should use or with 
how they should decide genuinely doubtful cases. His task remains 
descriptive. 
Most clients of lawyers are mainly concerned with how the state's 
coercive power might be applied to their situations, not with how an 
ideal judge would decide. Although lawyers giving advice are cer-
tainly participants in the legal system, something very close to the 
sociologist's approach is the one they take in advising clients. About 
subjects as to which no prevailing standard can be identified or the 
import of existing standards is uncertain, the lawyer as adviser is likely 
to say that the law is unsettled or unclear. 
Beyond the fact that a prevailing standard need not be socially 
shared, the sociologist's account of law is modest in some other impor-
tant respects. First, identification of relevant standards does not mean 
prediction of outcomes will necessarily be easy. Judges who agree on a 
standard of interpretation often disagree about its application to a par-
ticular case, especially when the standard is open-ended. Second, pre-
vailing standards may or may not include direct references to social 
morality or critical morality or to some vague combination or amal-
gam of these. There is no reason why an ultimate standard for law 
cannot include some moral criteria. Third, prevailing standards will 
shift subtly over time as new cases are presented and Justices change. 
None of these features is actually contrary to what Hart says, but The 
Concept of Law leaves the impression that the ultimate rule of recogni-
tion will be rather stable, will not refer much to moral criteria, and 
will allow rather clear identification of what counts as law. 
A fourth respect in which the sociologist's account is modest is the 
most important for an investigation of the adequacy of a conventional-
ist theory of law. The account as I have given it does not assert any 
particular explanation of why standards are prevailing. Indeed, the 
107. Subject, of course, to possible shifts in standards. 
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inclusion among prevailing standards of standards that are not gener-
ally shared already shows that not all prevailing standards need be 
conventionally accepted, that is, accepted as common standards for 
officials. But even among shared standards, acceptance by particular 
officials need not, as I have indicated in section VII, rest on their ac-
ceptance by other officials. Suppose that in a particular society virtu-
ally everyone believed on religious grounds that Moslem officials 
should be guided by the Koran in their decisions. Each official might 
take the Koran as a standard for what counts as law, but not because 
other officials happen to do so. In an account that is conventionalist in 
a strong sense, officials apply standards because they are accepted as 
common public standards. The sociologist's identification of widely 
shared standards does not assure that the standards are accepted by 
officials because they are regarded in this way. 
Hart's development of his "social rule" theory is primarily concep-
tual; but whether a society could have shared standards that do not 
rest on a conventional basis is an empirical, not a conceptual, question. 
I presently believe that in any society, at least any society with a mod-
erate degree of cultural diversity, conventional elements will be very 
powerful in determining what counts as law; but shared standards, 
and a fortiori prevailing standards that are not shared, may extend 
well beyond what is accepted for primarily conventional reasons. 
There are various tactics one might adopt to defend the notion that 
all law is based on convention, in the strong sense of being accepted 
for conventional reasons or derivable from what is accepted for those 
reasons. The simplest defense would be to claim that what is not set-
tled by convention does not count as law, whatever other status it 
might have. This defense would not only sharply cut back on what the 
sociologist could count as law using the "prevailing standards" ap-
proach, it would deny the status of law to standards for determining 
law that every official uses for nonconventional reasons. That result is 
too strongly counterintuitive to make this defense plausible. 
A second kind of defense is more promising. It concedes that stan-
dards for determining law are not all conventionally shared; but it 
claims that the exclusive source for developing those standards is con-
ventionally accepted materials. 108 This approach is suggested by one 
reading of Dworkin's famous essay Hard Cases. 109 Starting with the 
agreed-upon materials of the law, i.e., undoubted legal rules and legal 
institutions, a judge constructs the justificatory theory that best ex-
108. See Postema, supra note S. 
109. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 81-130; see also R. SARTORIUS, supra note 
71, at 181-210. 
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plains these, and applies that theory to difficult cases. So long as nec-
essary moral and political judgments required to construct the 
justificatory theory can be drawn from the materials themselves, and 
the best theory can be determined by "fit" with the materials alone, 
conventionally accepted materials might be the exclusive source of the 
standards for identifying law. This theory would be conventionalist 
only in a relatively weak sense, because it would concede that many 
prevailing standards for determining law are not themselves conven-
tionally accepted.110 
Is such a theory persuasive? Within any legal system, it will be an 
open question how much the standards for determining law are dic-
tated in one way or another by conventionally accepted rules and 
practices. Even if one acknowledges that the undoubted legal rules 
and institutions rest on conventional acceptance, it does not follow 
that all decisions about standards to use in legal interpretation will 
flow from these materials. "Independent" moral and political judg-
ments will come into play. That, indeed, is the position that Dworkin 
himself has consistently taken since Hard Cases, 111 and in his writings 
he has progressively emphasized the importance of these independent 
judgments.112 If such judgments matter, official efforts to determine 
law will not rest exclusively on conventional materials even in this 
weaker sense. 
A third defense of an ultimately conventionalist account is that 
even though judges may disagree about interpretive standards, and 
even though these standards may not be derivable from conventionally 
accepted materials, there may be conventional agreement on how 
judges should approach interpretive choices.113 Suppose, for example, 
that all agree that each judge should try as best he or she can to fit a 
theory of justification to the clear legal materials. In that event, judges 
would agree conventionally on their responsibilities. One difficulty 
about this theory is that the "agreed-upon standard" might be very 
unilluminating about actual criteria for determining law, since judicial 
disagreements would be so great. More importantly, perhaps, one 
could probably find an agreed-upon formulation only by moving to an 
extreme level of generality - e.g., judges should do what is right - or 
by using critical vague terms that would obscure genuine differences, 
110. In LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 124-30, Dworkin suggests that "soft conventional· 
ist" theories of this sort do not qualify as relevantly conventionalist. 
111. See, e.g., TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, app. at 340-42. 
112. See, e.g., Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited. 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 165, 170-71 (1982); 
LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 255-56. 
113. See Coleman, supra note 5, at 159. 
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such as whether judg~ legitimately inject their own views about moral 
and political philosophy into decisions. Further, even if judges do 
agree considerably on how they should approach hard interpretive 
questions, it is far from clear that they do so for exclusively conven-
tional reasons. In sum, the attempt to preserve conventionalism by 
turning to the judge's tasks in resolving difficult problems is not 
convincing. 
If we take the sociologist's perspective toward law, we may well 
preserve a "social fact" approach to law, one that refers to what is 
actually accepted and used in some sense; but the approach would not 
be fully conventionalist, that is, it would not claim that all of what is 
accepted as law is accepted because it has a conventional status. 
2. The Participant's Account 
I tum now to an account of law for a judge or other participant 
who makes legal decisions. The judge is interested in making a correct 
normative decision about the law. 114 He is concerned with the stan-
dards that he should employ, not merely with the standards most 
judges happen to be using. What are the ultimate criteria of law for 
him? I shall attend here to a Supreme Court Justice or other judge of 
a highest court, and I shall disregard whatever principles of deference 
may exist to the determinations of the political branches, that is, prin-
ciples that tell judges not to decide for themselves whether a norm is 
legal but to accept the judgment of someone else. 
One possible position, suggested by Hart's analysis, is that what is 
law for the sociologist is congruent with what is law for the judge. 
What is unclear is not law until the judges settle a matter; then it 
becomes law either because judges have the prior authority to settle 
such things or because what the judges say in fact gets accepted by 
others as a correct statement of the law. There are two fundamental 
difficulties with this approach. One, already discussed, is that as they 
approach hard decisions judges typically do not conceive of the law as 
"running out."115 The second difficulty is that judges often consider to 
be dispositive in hard cases the same sorts of "legal" considerations 
that yield clear answers to easy cases. Judges do not usually conceive 
of their function as being judicial up to a point, and then legislative. 
These are the essential points that have made Dworkin's attack on the 
114. I am omitting other participatory roles that connect to the judge's role. Starting from 
the interests of their clients, lawyers seek to persuade judges what standards to adopt. Scholars 
and other critics attempt, ordinarily from a noninterested perspective, to indicate what judges 
should do. 
115. I believe that judges sometimes do perceive the law as running out. 
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rule of recognition seem so powerful, and they have force even if one 
does not think the law provides an answer to every case. 
Let us suppose that disagreements between judges over interpretive 
strategies can occur because of differences of judgment over "fit" with 
the undoubted legal materials, or because of differences of judgment 
about moral and political philosophy that are not determined by fit. 
Unlike Dworkin, 116 I think it is somewhat misleading for a judge to 
say "the law" really requires one answer rather than another, if the 
judge is aware that what distinguishes his answer from a competing 
one is an independent moral or political judgment that is not 
shared. 117 But if the judge thinks the difference concerns adequacy of 
fit with the legal materials, and all agree that fit is what counts, the 
judge rightly puts it that the law requires his answer. An account of 
law might draw such a distinction, but it would not track very well the 
experience of judges in deciding cases, since judges rarely distinguish 
precisely the input of independent judgment from fit. 
From the judge's point of view, it may be most helpful to regard 
the standards for determining law as including every relevant standard 
the judge regards himself as bound to use in answering a legal ques-
tion. In that event, the standards for determining law may include 
general standards for evaluative reasoning as well as distinctively legal 
standards. Since judges, like Justice Black adhering to his rigid fourth 
amendment approach, may well decide they are legally bound to do 
things that they know others do not assume they are legally bound to 
do, it may seem that an adequate account of law must be essentially 
normative. 
Any such characterization, however, is substantially misleading if 
it implies that convention has little or no role. Officials are bound to 
adhere to much of what is conventionally established because they 
have explicitly or implicitly agreed to do so, because the justified ex-
pectations of citizens and other officials are based on established prac-
tices, and because officials' following established practices usually 
permits a more efficient resolution of social problems. 
As I have suggested, the conventional aspects operate at three 
levels. What are taken as basic legal materials and institutions are 
matters of established social practice. A judge who swears to uphold 
the Constitution means our Constitution; he or she has promised to 
treat our Constitution and the organs of government created under it 
116. See LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 260-63. 
117. A person who comes at the problem with different independent answers will hardly be 
reassured that "the law" requires an answer contrary to his simply because a majority of those 
who happen to be judges disagree with him. 
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as authoritative in our legal system.118 Insofar as the basic legal 
materials and institutions are the foundations for "fit" arguments, con-
vention operates as the ground for much of the normative evaluation 
of judges. Finally convention operates directly at the level of interpre-
tive practice when judges follow precedents and established interpre-
tive standards that they would not have adopted, or join majority 
opinions whose approach is not exactly the one they would choose. 
Exactly how far judges do and should rely on convention is difficult to 
say, and the right answers would obviously vary for different societies, 
legal systems, and stages of history. What one can confidently say 
about our legal system, and probably any modern legal system, is that 
conventional bases are very important ingredients in determinations of 
law. 
How to conceptualize the view from inside is troublesome. One 
might say that since the judge is trying to determine the correct an-
swer, and since factors other than convention may be relevant, we 
have a "normative account" which assigns a subsidiary place to con-
vention. But this seems a little too neat. Suppose judges were trying 
to determine the correct answers - but they regarded themselves as 
entirely bound to adhere to what is conventionally established, and 
they thought that beyond what was conventionally established the law 
did not constrain them. Then we would have a fully conventional ac-
count oflaw. Suppose a single other normative factor were introduced 
that in some slight proportion of cases was determinative. Would we 
then need to shift to a "normative" account of law and away from a 
"conventional" one? If convention is almost entirely determinative of 
what counts as law, then saying that we have a largely conventional 
account, qualified by another factor, would seem more apt. If other 
normative factors are much larger in importance but convention is still 
absolutely critical, perhaps we can best speak of a mixed conventional 
and normative account. Whatever the label, we should recognize that 
the account of law for the inside participant makes existing social 
practice less decisive for what counts as law than it is for the sociolo-
gisf s account. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen that Hart's rule of recognition theory requires sub-
stantial supplementation if it is to account for what insiders regard as 
law. Given the intertwining of judgments about the materials them-
118. Once officials promise in their oath of office to uphold the law, or implicitly undertake 
to do so by accepting their positions, the direct normative force of convention is supplemented by 
the normative force of promise. 
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selves, their moral and political implications, and the judge's in-
dependent moral and political assumptions, one needs to acknowledge 
that the boundaries of law are not the same as the boundaries of what 
is conventionally accepted. But if Hart's theory requires some revi-
sions, it illuminates critical conventional elements in any satisfactory 
theory of law for the United States. Its basic outline, with additions 
and qualifications, remains a powerful explanatory account of how a 
sociologist might approach the law of a society, and of why an insider 
accords authoritative status to much that counts as law. Further, 
Hart's theory is an important beginning toward understanding how 
convention and normative judgments interact when a judge deals with 
interpretive techniques and other subtle aspects of law. 
